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SUMMARY	We	 present	 a	 ground-to-space	 quantum	 key	 distribution	 (QKD)	 mission	 concept	 and	 the	accompanying	feasibility	study	for	the	development	of	the	low	earth	orbit	CubeSat	payload.	The	quantum	 information	 is	 carried	 by	 single	 photons	 with	 the	 binary	 codes	 represented	 by	polarization	states	of	the	photons.	Distribution	of	entangled	photons	between	the	ground	and	the	 satellite	 can	 be	 used	 to	 certify	 the	 quantum	 nature	 of	 the	 link:	 a	 guarantee	 that	 no	eavesdropping	can	take	place.	By	placing	the	entangled	photon	source	on	the	ground,	the	space	segments	contains	“only”	the	less	complex	detection	system,	enabling	its	 implementation	in	a	compact	 enclosure,	 compatible	 with	 the	 12U	 CubeSat	 standard	 (12	 dm3).	 This	 reduces	 the	overall	 cost	 of	 the	 project,	 making	 it	 an	 ideal	 choice	 as	 a	 pathfinder	 for	 future	 European	quantum	communication	satellite	missions.	The	space	segment	is	also	more	versatile	than	one	that	contains	the	source	since	it	is	compatible	with	a	multiple	of	QKD	protocols	(not	restricted	to	entangled	photon	schemes)	and	can	be	used	 in	quantum	physics	experiments,	 such	as	 the	investigation	 of	 entanglement	 decoherence.	 Other	 possible	 experiments	 include	 atmospheric	transmission/turbulence	characterization,	dark	area	mapping,	 fine	pointing	and	tracking,	and	accurate	 clock	 synchronization;	 all	 crucial	 for	 future	 global	 scale	 quantum	 communication	efforts.	
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1.1. INTRODUCTION	Quantum	communication	is	reaching	a	level	of	maturity	that	makes	it	a	practically	certain	choice	for	 future	 secure	 cryptography.	 In	 fact,	 Quantum	 Key	 Distribution	 (QKD)	 provides	 a	 level	 of	communication	 security	 that	 cannot	 be	 obtained	 by	 classical	 cryptographic	 means,	 including	those	 based	 on	 numerical	 algorithms.	 The	 quantum	 information	 can	 be	 coded	 into	 the	polarization	state	of	a	single	photon.	The	linearity	of	quantum	mechanics	leads	to	the	no-cloning	theorem,	which	states	that	an	arbitrary	unknown	quantum	state	cannot	be	copied	perfectly	[1].	In	a	properly	designed	experiment,	an	eavesdropping	attempt	by	a	third	party	(commonly	called	“Eve”	 in	 the	 language	of	 cryptography),	would	necessarily	 lead	 to	detectable	errors.	Given	our	ever-growing	 reliance	 on	 secure	 data	 communication,	 the	 intrinsic	 security	 of	 quantum	communication	largely	outweighs	the	disadvantages	of	additional	complexity	and	cost.	QKD	has	already	been	demonstrated	to	be	a	practical	way	to	distribute	secret	keys	between	two	parties	 in	 a	 number	 of	 fiber	 networks,	 some	 of	 them	 even	 using	 existing	 telecommunication	infrastructure	 (see,	 e.g.,	 [2]	 and	 references	 therein).	 However,	 even	 in	 ultra-low	 loss	 fibers,	losses	limit	the	maximum	distance	between	two	parties	to	a	few	hundred	kilometers,	since	the	no-cloning	theorem	prohibits	the	use	of	simple	optical	amplifiers.	Much	progress	has	been	made	in	the	development	of	quantum	repeaters	using	entanglement	swapping	over	subsections	of	the	overall	 distance.	 This	 requires	 heralding	 of	 successful	 entanglement	 creation	 over	 the	intermediate	 distances,	 as	 well	 as	 storage	 of	 the	 entanglement	 until	 entanglement	 has	 been	established	in	the	adjacent	link	[3].	Taken	together	this	means	that	quantum	repeaters	remain	a	technologically	extremely	challenging	solution.	The	alternative	of	Earth-bound	free-space	optical	links	is	ultimately	limited	by	Earth’s	curvature.	A	more	promising	approach	is	to	use	a	satellite	terminal	that	can	potentially	provide	global	scale	quantum	key	distribution.		From	a	more	fundamental	physics	point	of	view,	the	same	space	segment	that	 is	the	subject	of	this	paper	could	be	used	for	the	investigation	of	the	interaction	between	entangled	photons	and	the	gravitational	 field	[4].	The	 implied	 interrelation	between	Einstein’s	 theory	of	relativity	and	Quantum	Mechanics	presents	one	of	the	most	interesting	questions	in	modern	physics.		Several	 schemes	 exist	 to	 implement	 QKD	 between	 two	 parties,	 a	 sender	 named	 “Alice”	 and	 a	receiver	 known	 as	 “Bob”.	 The	 first	 and	 probably	 best-known	 protocol	 is	 due	 to	 Bennett	 and	Brassard	(“BB84”)	that	proposed	a	scheme	of	exchanging	a	secure	key	by	encoding	the	quantum	information	 in	 the	 polarization	 state	 of	 single	 photons	 [5].	 In	 1991	Arthur	Ekert	 proposed	 an	entanglement-based	protocol	(“E91”)	[6],	which	has	the	advantage	that	a	simple	statistical	test	(“Bell	 test”)	 allows	 one	 to	 certify	 the	 quantum	 nature	 of	 the	 link,	 and	 therewith	 its	 inherent	security.	 Even	 if	 Eve	 controls	 the	 source	 she	 still	 cannot	 obtain	 information	 about	 the	 key	exchanged	by	Alice	and	Bob	 [6,	7,	8].	 In	E91,	of	each	pair,	one	photon	 is	directed	 towards	 the	(local)	polarization	analyzer	and	detection	module	of	Alice,	 the	other	 is	directed	 towards	Bob,	who	just	like	Alice	measures	the	polarization	state	of	every	photon	in	a	randomly	chosen	basis	for	 each	 photon	 and	 notes	 its	 arrival	 time.	 In	 our	 implementation,	 both	 the	 Alice	 and	 Bob	detection	modules	use	a	50/50	beam	splitter	to	send	the	photons	randomly	to	one	of	two	sets	of	two	detectors	that	define	two	mutually	unbiased	bases	[9]	(identified	as	horizontal–vertical	and	diagonal–anti-diagonal,	 {HV}	 and	 {DA}).	 Alice	 and	 Bob	 open	 a	 noiseless,	 authenticated,	 but	insecure,	 public	 communication	 channel	 and	 communicate	 the	 photon	 arrival	 times	 and	 the	basis	 in	 which	 each	 photon	 was	 detected.	 Of	 all	 coincidence	 events	 in	 which	 Alice	 and	 Bob	
3/34 simultaneously	 measured	 a	 photon	 they	 keep	 only	 those	 for	 which	 they	 both	 used	 the	 same	polarization	basis.	After	this	basis	reconciliation	step,	Alice	and	Bob	both	hold	the	sifted	key.	This	bit	string	may	still	contain	errors,	due	to	experimental	 imperfections	or	due	to	eavesdropping,	requiring	 a	 classical	 error	 correction	 procedure,	 followed	 by	 a	 process	 known	 as	 privacy	amplification	 that	 further	 suppresses	 any	 information	 a	 hypothetical	 eavesdropper	may	 have	obtained.	Only	at	the	end	of	this	step	do	Alice	and	Bob	share	a	quantum	secured	secret	key.		Here	we	report	on	a	recently	completed	feasibility	study	towards	the	demonstration	of	optical	quantum	 communication	 in	 free	 space	 between	 an	 Optical	 Ground	 Station	 (OGS)	 and	 a	nanosatellite.	By	placing	the	entangled	photon	source	on	the	ground	the	space	segment	contains	the	“Bob”	detection	system	only,	and	therefore	consumes	less	power,	becomes	smaller	and	less	complex,	 thus	 increasing	 its	 reliability,	 and	 implementation	 in	 the	 12U	 CubeSat	 standard	 is	possible	 [10].	 The	 space	 segment	 payload	 is	 also	 versatile:	 the	 receiver	 is	 compatible	 with	multiple	QKD	protocols	and	other	quantum	physics	experiments.	In	addition,	the	sensitive	single	photon	detectors	 in	combination	with	a	small	 field-of-view	telescope	can	be	used	 to	map	 light	pollution	 on	 Earth	 at	 the	 quantum	 channel	 wavelength.	 This	 is	 important	 information	 for	deciding	 the	 location	of	 future	optical	 ground	stations	 that	 ideally	would	not	be	 far	 from	high	population	 density,	 urban	 areas.	 The	 drawback	 is	 an	 increased,	 but	 still	 acceptable,	 effect	 of	atmospheric	 turbulence	 on	 the	 link	 budget	 due	 to	 the	 shower	 curtain	 effect	 [11].	 But	 this	disadvantage	of	a	higher	uplink	 loss	 (by	roughly	10	dB)	 is	accompanied	by	 the	advantage	of	a	lower	 photon	 detection	 rate	 on	 board	 of	 the	 satellite	 and	 therewith	 a	 significantly	 smaller	amount	 of	 data	 to	 be	 stored	 and	 exchanged	 with	 the	 OGS	 via	 a	 classical	 (RF	 or	 optical),	authenticated	but	non-secure	communication	channel.		In	addition	to	 its	principal	scientific	aim	of	demonstrating	ground-to-space	QKD	with	a	CubeSat,	the	NanoBob	mission	has	the	technological	aims	of:	a) Accurate	 clock	 synchronization	 between	 the	 ground-based	 station	 and	 the	 flight	platform.	b) Fine	attitude	determination	and	control	 to	ensure	correct	pointing	of	source	and	receiver	under	dynamic	conditions.	c) The	use	of	eye-safe	 laser	beams	at	1550	nm	on	the	ground	station	and	the	space	segment	 as	 laser	 tracking	 beacons,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 they	 are	 used	 for	 fast	classical	 optical	 communication	 using	 pulse	 position	 modulation,	 potentially	 at	rates	up	to	roughly	1	Gbit/s.		In	the	following	we	briefly	discuss	some	relevant	developments	in	the	field	before	presenting	a	mission	overview,	the	design	of	the	NanoBob	space	segment,	and	the	expected	link	budget.	We	limit	 ourselves	 here	 to	 the	 QKD	mission	 scenario.	 Aspects	 relating	 to	 the	 duplex	 fast	 optical	communication	link,	and	the	alternative	mission	scenarios	of	low	light	level	dark	area	mapping	and	the	quantum	physics	study	of	entanglement	decoherence	will	be	left	for	future	reporting.	
	
1.2. THE	RACE	TO	SPACE:	RELATION	TO	OTHER	ONGOING	PROJECTS	On	 August	 16,	 2016,	 the	 Chinese	 Space	 agency	 launched	 the	 620-kg	 Micius	 satellite	 with	 on	board	 the	 quantum	 communications	 experiment	 at	 space	 scale	 (QUESS)	 that	 includes	 an	entangled	photon-pair	source.	The	payload	is	capable	of	establishing	two	simultaneous	quantum	
4/34 downlinks	 to	 two	 ground	 stations	 on	 Earth	 1200	 km	 apart	 from	 a	 satellite	 that	 moves	 in	 a	slightly	elliptical	orbit	with	an	apogee	at	584	km.	The	reported	Bell	test	experiment	showed	that	entanglement	persisted	over	a	combined	distance	of	over	1600	km	[12].	The	same	platform	was	used	to	demonstrate	decoy-state	QKD	from	satellite	to	a	ground	optical	station	near	Beijing	[13].		Also	 recently,	 researchers	 in	Tokyo	reported	on	a	QKD	experiment	using	a	downlink	 from	the	50-kg-class	Socrates	microsatellite	[14],	and	the	Singapore	group	operated	an	entangled	source	on	a	CubeSat	[15].	Several	other	teams	in	Canada,	Europe,	and	elsewhere,	are	working	to	bring	quantum	 communication	 to	 space.	 Bedington	 et	 al.	 provide	 a	 table	 of	 notable	 satellite	 QKD	proposals	[16].		In	 2002	 first	 experiments	 using	 BB84	 protocols	 were	 published	 demonstrating	 QKD	 on	 a	horizontal	 link	 [17].	 Experiments	 using	 entangled	photons	have	been	done	over	144	km	 [18].	The	 losses	experienced	by	 the	horizontal	 link	 through	 the	 turbulent	atmosphere	 (~35	dB)	are	quite	comparable	to	those	expected	for	a	single	path	between	a	ground	station	and	a	satellite	in	Low	Earth	Orbit	(LEO).		To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	NanoBob,	having	completed	its	end-of-phase-0	Mission	Definition	Review	following	ESA	guidelines	[19],	is	so	far	the	most	advanced	European	project	focusing	on	the	 use	 of	 entangled	 photons	 and	 a	 CubeSat	 platform.	 It	 will	 demonstrate	 the	 feasibility	 of	miniaturizing	(both	in	volume	and	in	power	consumption)	the	Bob	receiver	module,	promising	to	 significantly	 lower	 the	 development	 time	 and	 cost	 of	 future	 quantum	 space	 missions,	 and	opens	 the	way	 to	using	a	constellation	of	 relatively	cheap	satellites	 to	achieve	global	 coverage	and	low	latency.		NanoBob	distinguishes	 itself	 by	 the	use	 of	 a	CubeSat	 receiver	 terminal	 that	will	 be	 capable	 of	executing	most	polarization-based	single	photon	bi-partite	protocols;	most	notably	BB84	[5]	and	its	 more	 secure	 decoy-state	 variant	 [20],	 as	 well	 as	 the	 E91	 protocol	 based	 on	 the	 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen	 gedanken	 experiment	 [6].	 Additionally	 other	 secure	 quantum	 communication	tasks	such	as	secure	password	authentication	can	be	performed	using	the	NanoBob	payload	and	bit-commitment	protocols	[21].	Taking	the	expected	link	attenuation	into	account,	we	predict	to	be	able	to	exchange	keys	of	over	105	bits	during	one	OGS	fly-over	of	the	satellite	(~3	min.).	With	such	technology,	one	can	already	imagine	an	infrastructure	arising,	consisting	of	several	optical	ground	stations	that	exchange	quantum	secure	keys	through	a	CubeSat	in	LEO	(a	trusted	node)	on	 a	 truly	 global	 scale.	One	 satellite	 can	 consecutively	 exchange	 two	different	 unconditionally	secure	 keys	with	 two	different	 ground	 stations.	A	 bit-wise	XOR	operation	 on	 the	 two	keys	 on	board	 of	 the	 satellite	 than	 yields	 a	random	 bit	 sequence	 that	 can	 be	shared	publically	with	one	of	 the	 two	ground	 stations.	 This	 ground	 station	can	then	compute	the	secure	key	held	by	 the	 other	 ground	 station	 by	repeating	 the	 same	 operation	 on	 the	random	 bit	 sequence	 and	 its	 own	secure	 key	 [22].	 It	 is	 noted	 that	whereas	the	Micius	satellite	node	with	its	on-board	entangled	photon	source	does	 not	 need	 to	 be	 trusted	 as	 it	
Figure 1. Global unconditionally secure quantum key 
distribution through a trusted node in uplink configuration 
[22]. 
5/34 exchanges	 a	 quantum	 key	 between	 two	 simultaneously	 visible	 OGSs,	 distributing	 a	 key	 on	 a	global	scale	would	require	that	the	satellite	reverts	to	the	scheme	mentioned	above	(and	thus	to	become	a	trusted	node),	or	otherwise,	somehow,	stores	one	of	the	entangled	photons	on	board	until	it	reaches	the	second	OGS.		In	 addition	 to	 demonstrating	 QKD	 in	 an	 uplink	 configuration,	 we	 prepare	 to	 use	 the	 beacon	lasers	required	for	the	mutual	tracking	of	the	satellite	and	the	OGS	to	establish	an	optical,	two-way	 communication	 channel.	 Such	 a	 high-speed	 classical	 channel	 is	 practically	mandatory	 for	future	satellite	QKD	operations	if	they	are	to	exchange	and	negotiate	useful	(i.e.,	sufficiently	long)	sifted	 keys	 in	 a	 relatively	 short	 time	 frame.	 Using	 wavelengths	 in	 the	 telecomm	 region,	 as	opposed	 to	 the	 visible	 or	 the	 short-wave	 infrared	 regions	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 implies	 that	 the	classical	 communication	 channel	 becomes	 directly	 compatible	 with	 existing	 telecomm	infrastructure.			
1.3. QKD	MISSION	SCENARIO	The	orbit	in	which	the	NanoBob	satellite	will	be	launched	has	to	satisfy	a	number	of	criteria.	First,	it	needs	 to	comply	with	applicable	space	 laws.	The	French	 law	on	space	operations	requires	a	decommissioning	and	destruction	of	 the	satellite	upon	 its	 return	 in	Earth’s	atmosphere	within	25	years	after	end	of	operations	[23].	For	the	12U	satellite	without	propulsion	and	with	a	weight	of	about	10	kg,	this	puts	a	higher	limit	of	about	650	km	to	the	height	of	a	circular	orbit.	Several	circular	 orbital	 scenarios	 were	 investigated	 using	 the	 Celestlab/Stela/VTS	 orbital	 simulation	tools	of	the	French	National	Space	Agency	(CNES).	As	the	primary	ground	station	location	we	use	the	ESA	OGS	at	Tenerife	on	the	Canary	Islands	(28.30086N,	16.51172W,	2410	m	asl).	We	could	satisfy	the	demand	of	maximizing	the	number	of	OGS	encounters	during	nighttime	by	choosing	an	 orbital	 inclination	 equal	 to	 the	 latitude	 of	 the	OGS.	However,	 as	we	want	 to	 be	 free	 to	 use	other	OGSs,	and	need	 to	download	data	 to	RF	ground	stations	 located	elsewhere,	we	conclude	that	a	Sun	Synchronous	Orbit	(SSO)	at	a	height	of	550	km	and	a	local	hour	of	22h30	appears	a	near	optimal	choice.	With	an	orbit	 time	of	96	min,	 the	satellite	will	make	an	average	of	15	full	orbits	per	day.	Depending	on	the	exact	weight	and	the	effective	drag	area	(i.e.,	the	product	of	the	drag	 coefficient	 and	 the	 cross-sectional	 area	 perpendicular	 to	 the	 direction	 of	 motion),	 the	expected	lifetime	is	between	3	(10	kg,	0.11	m2)	and	11	years	(24	kg,	0.08	m2	–	the	surface	area	of	one	 side	panel).	There	are	a	 fair	number	of	 rideshare	 launch	opportunities	 into	 such	an	orbit,	lowering	 the	 cost	 of	 the	mission	 [24].	 Limiting	 the	 distance	 at	 closest	 approach	 of	 the	OGS	 at	which	 the	satellite	passes	 to	750	km	(i.e.,	 the	ground	 track	passes	within	500	km	of	 the	OGS),	between	 1	 and	 2	 encounters	 per	 night	 can	 be	 expected,	 each	 with	 a	 total	 duration	 >	 440	 s	(assuming	tracking	for	elevations	>	20°)	of	which	roughly	one	half	will	be	available	for	the	QKD	experiment.	Figure	2	shows	the	ground	tracks	for	the	selected	orbit.	
6/34 
	A	 typical	 encounter	 will	 have	 the	 satellite	 adapt	 its	 attitude	 just	 before	 arriving	 above	 the	horizon,	such	that	its	telescope	is	oriented	towards	the	expected	location	of	the	OGS.	During	this	pre-acquisition	 flight	 segment	 pointing	 of	 the	 satellite	 towards	 the	 OGS	 relies	 on	 satellite	ephemeris	 and	 star	 tracker	 data.	 A	 state-of-the-art	 integrated	 Attitude	 Determination	 and	Control	 System	 (ADCS)	 designed	 for	 6	 to	 12U	 CubeSats,	 such	 as,	 e.g.,	 the	 XACT-50	 by	 Blue	Canyon	Technologies,	 is	already	able	 to	point	 the	satellite	with	a	1-sigma	precision	of	50	µrad	(11	arcsec)	about	an	axis	perpendicular	to	the	star	tracker	bore	(which	in	our	case	is	parallel	to	the	quantum	channel	line	of	sight).	This	should	be	sufficient	to	bring	the	OGS	within	sight	of	the	satellite,	given	the	FOV	of	9	mrad	(0.5°)	of	its	beacon	detection	module,	which	images	the	ground	laser	beacon	onto	a	quadrant	detector,	as	well	as	onto	a	 linear	polarization	analyzer.	This	will	enable	the	satellite	to	fine-tune	its	attitude,	both	about	the	two	axes	perpendicular	to	the	line	of	sight	(using	the	quadrant	signal)	and	about	the	line	of	sight	(using	the	linear	polarization	of	the	beacon	laser).	Inertial	calculations	show	that	this	process	should	not	take	longer	than	about	30	s.		At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 OGS	 beacon	 laser	 illuminates	 the	 corner	 cubes	 on	 the	 satellite	 and	 the	satellite	may	turn	on	its	beacon	laser	to	make	it	more	easily	visible	to	the	OGS.	Either	way	the	beacon	 light	 received	 by	 the	 OGS	 telescope	 will	 enable	 it	 to	 acquire,	 and	 start	 tracking,	 the	satellite.	The	corner	cubes	are	built-in	as	a	back-up	solution	for	the	satellite	beacon	laser.	They	have	 the	 added	 advantage	 that	 they	 return	 the	 beacon	 laser	 towards	 the	 OGS,	 also	 if	 the	satellite’s	 telescope	 is	 not	 (yet)	 accurately	 oriented	 towards	 the	 OGS	 (using,	 e.g.,	 star	 tracker	information).	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	satellite	beacon	laser,	which	will	not	be	seen	by	the	OGS	until	 the	 satellite	 is	 fairly	 accurately	 directed	 towards	 the	 OGS.	We	 note	 that	 the	 OGS	will	 be	equipped	with	a	changeable	dichroic	beamsplitter	in	order	to	adapt	the	detection	wavelength	to	that	of	the	beacon	laser	being	used	(i.e.,	OGS	versus	satellite).	Accurate	pointing,	acquisition,	and	tracking	(PAT)	during	the	quantum	science	segment	of	the	flight	over	the	OGS	thus	rely	on	direct	feedback	of	error	signals	obtained	from	detection	of	the	beacon	lasers.		At	 this	point,	with	satellite	and	OGS	 telescope	 tracking	each	other,	 the	exchange	of	a	quantum	key	 can	 commence.	During	 the	 next	 roughly	 three	minutes	 the	 satellite	 detects	 and	 times	 the	arrival	of	single	photons	that	are	collected	by	its	telescope	and	analyzes	their	polarization	state.	
Figure	2.	Ground	tracks	of	the	simulated	SSO	at	550	km	altitude	and	with	local	hour	of	22h30	over	a	period	of	1	day.	The	inclination	of	the	SSO	orbit	is	98°.	
 
7/34 At	 the	 end	 of,	 or	 already	 during,	 this	 phase	 the	 satellite	 opens	 an	 authenticated	 public	communication	 channel	 (either	 optical	 or	 RF,	 with	 the	 same	 or	 another	 ground	 station)	 and	sends	the	photon	arrival	times	and	the	basis	in	which	each	photon	was	detected	to	the	ground	station.	The	 latter	 then	proceeds	with	clock	synchronization	by	performing	a	cross-correlation	operation	on	 the	 time	 series	of	photon	detection	 times,	 comparing	 it	 to	 its	own	 time	 series	of	photon	 detection	 events	 [18,	 25].	 This	 procedure	 reduces	 the	 coincidence	 time	 window	 to	roughly	 a	 few	 hundred	 picoseconds,	 ultimately	 limited	 by	 detector	 jitter.	 A	 small	 coincidence	time	 window	 reduces	 accidental	 coincidences	 due	 to	 detector	 dark	 counts	 and	 residual	background	 counts.	 Finally,	 the	 ground	 station	 and	 satellite	 carry	 out	 the	 basis	 reconciliation,	error	correction,	and	privacy	amplification	steps	to	produce	the	quantum	secure	key	shared	by	the	OGS	and	the	satellite.	In	section	1.7	we	will	provide	an	estimate	of	the	rate	at	which	such	a	key	can	be	constructed.		The	 quantum	 channel	 will	 operate	 at	 a	 wavelength	 of	 808	 nm,	 a	 choice	 that	 reflects	 the	availability	 of	 a	 highly	 efficient	 entangled	 photon	 source	 and	 of	 single	 photon	 detectors	 that	combine	 sub-nanosecond	 jitter	 with	 a	 high	 quantum	 efficiency	 and	 that	 require	 only	 modest	cooling	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 a	 low	 dark	 count	 rate.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 while	 atmospheric	absorption	and	scattering	are	higher	at	 this	wavelength	than	in	the	telecom	wavelength	range,	these	effects	are	more	than	compensated	for	by	the	relatively	high	photon	detection	efficiency.		During	 the	daylight	part	of	 the	orbit	 the	 satellite	orients	 the	 solar	panels	on	one	or	 two	of	 its	sides	towards	the	Sun	 in	order	to	recharge	the	batteries.	The	use	of	deployable	solar	panels	 is	avoided	as	their	 limited	rigidity	could	reduce	the	precision	of	 the	satellite’s	pointing.	The	star-tracker	 and	 telescope	 sun	 exclusion	 angles	 (~45	 degrees)	 are	 automatically	 satisfied	 in	 this	orbital	scenario,	while	 it	 is	also	compatible	with	communication	with	an	RF	ground	station,	as	the	S-band	patch	antennas	will	be	located	on	the	opposing	side	panels.		
1.4. CRITICAL	SATELLITE	SUBSYSTEMS	The	NanoBob	mission	will	miniaturize	the	Bob	receiver	payload	for	it	to	fit	inside	a	12U	CubeSat	frame.	This	 size	 limit	 is	 chosen	 as	 the	 smallest	 CubeSat	 standard	 that	 allows	 for	 a	 reasonably	large	main	telescope	of	150-mm	diameter	(potentially	up	to	180-mm	diameter),	 increasing	the	light	collection	efficiency	by	a	 factor	of	 four	(6	dB)	compared	the	alternatives	of	3U	or	6U	and	providing	 sufficient	 space	 to	 incorporate	 the	 required	 beacon	 laser	with	 a	 secondary,	 smaller	telescope.	 Figure	 3	 gives	 a	 schematic	 representation	 of	 the	 assembly,	while	 Table	 1	 gives	 the	estimated	size,	weight,	 and	power	 (SWaP)	 consumption	of	 the	 subsystems	 together	with	 their	uncertainties.	 The	 definition	 of	 the	 Technology	Readiness	 Levels	 is	 according	 to	 ISO	 standard	16290:2013	as	adopted	by	ESA	[26].		
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	Figure	3.	Computer	aided	design	of	the	assembly	showing	the	main	components	of	the	light	collection	optics	 (LCO),	 polarization	 analysis	 and	 detection	module	 (PAD),	 star	 tracker	 (SS),	 on-board	 computer	(OBC),	 solar	panels	and	 the	radiator	 (RAD)	 for	passive	detector	cooling.	Notably,	 the	 laser	beacon	 (LB)	with	its	telescope	and	the	battery	packs	are	not	shown	to	provide	an	unobstructed	view	of	the	remainder.						
	 	
9/34 	Table	1.	Results	of	a	SWaP	(Size,	Weight,	and	Power)	analysis,	including	contingency.	
Item	 Size	(ml)	
Weight	
(g)	
Peak	
Power	
(mW)	
TRL	 Margin	
Size	
Margin	
Weight	
Margin	
Power	
Margin	
Payload	 5	045	 2	680	 14	500	 		 		 1160	 819	 6850	
Quantum	Optical	
Module	(808	nm)	
125	 200	 4	000	 4	 50%	 63	 100	 2000	
Beacon	Receiver	
Module	(1530	nm)	
145	 360	 6	000	 3	 50%	 73	 180	 3000	
LCO-QKD	 4	050	 830	 0	 4	 20%	 810	 166	 0	
Beacon	Transmitter	
Module	(1565	nm)	
200	 350	 1	500	 2	 50%	 100	 175	 750	
Retro-reflector	 125	 340	 0	 7	 20%	 25	 68	 0	
Detector	cooling	 100	 300	 0	 2	 20%	 20	 60	 0	
Time	Tagging	Module	 100	 100	 2	000	 2	 50%	 50	 50	 1000	
Beacon	Signal	
Processing	
100	 100	 500	 7	 10%	 10	 10	 50	
Data	storage	 100	 100	 500	 7	 10%	 10	 10	 50	
Platform	 5	425	 5	148	 12	060	 		 		 403	 443	 617	
OBC	 110	 94	 500	 9	 5%	 6	 5	 25	
ADCS	 750	 1	225	 2	470	 9	 5%	 38	 61	 124	
GPS	 35	 24	 1	200	 9	 5%	 2	 1	 60	
UHF/VHF	module	 110	 75	 4	000	 9	 5%	 6	 4	 200	
S-Band	module	 130	 62	 3	800	 9	 5%	 7	 3	 190	
Antennes		 110	 128	 0	 9	 5%	 6	 6	 0	
PMU	&	batteries	 680	 840	 90	 9	 20%	 136	 168	 18	
Mechanical	structure	 3	000	 2	000	 0	 9	 5%	 150	 100	 0	
Detector	radiators	 200	 400	 0	 5	 20%	 40	 80	 0	
Solar	panels	 300	 300	 0	 9	 5%	 15	 15	 0	
TOTAL	PAYLOAD	&	
PLATFORM	
10	470	 7	828	 26	560	 		 		 1563	 1262	 7467			The	SWaP	analysis	of	Table	1	shows	that	the	estimated	maximum	volume	including	contingency	is	12	L,	 the	maximum	weight	 is	9	kg,	 and	 the	peak	power	 consumption	 can	 reach	34	W.	Both	volume	and	weight	are	well	within	the	limits	of	19.9	L	and	24	kg	imposed	by	the	12U	CubeSat	standard	 [10].	Table	1	also	enables	estimation	of	 the	energy	consumption	per	orbit.	The	most	critical	 orbital	 scenario	 is,	 not	 surprisingly,	 the	 scientific	 scenario	 of	 a	QKD	experiment.	 For	 a	worst	case	estimation	we	assume	that	the	initial	alignment	phase	takes	5	minutes,	the	quantum	experiment	 lasts	5	min.,	 the	beacon	 lasers	will	be	operated	during	this	entire	period	(10	min.)	and	 the	 S-band	 communication	 with	 the	 ground	 station	 lasts	 10	 min.	 We	 then	 calculate	 an	energy	consumption	of	9.2	Wh	during	one	full	orbit.	This	is	to	be	compared	with	the	recharging	capacity	of	the	batteries	of	21.6	Wh	provided	by	the	solar	panels	during	the	same	orbit.	 It	also	means	 that	 the	 installed	 battery	 capacity	 of	 66	Wh	will	 see	 a	 cycling	 of	 less	 than	 15%	 of	 its	nominal,	initial	capacity.	We	thus	expect	that	the	batteries	can	easily	sustain	the	~16400	cycles	
10/34 during	the	longest	expected	operational	lifetime	of	the	satellite	of	3	years	(which	is	more	likely	limited	by	radiation	damage	to	the	detectors).	In	the	following	sections	we	describe	the	subsystems	that	have	been	identified	as	most	critical	to	the	 mission	 outlined	 above.	 All	 other	 subsystems	 (such	 as	 power	 systems	 and	 OBC)	 can	 be	purchased	 commercially	 off-the-shelf	 and	 be	 used	 with	 minimal	 modification.	 They	 also	generally	have	space	heritage.		
1.4.1. LIGHT	COLLECTION	OPTICS	The	optical	module	(see	Fig.	4)	is	literally	(at)	the	center	of	the	payload.	It	consists	of	a	telescope	with	high	 light	gathering	power	 followed	by	 the	quantum	channel	polarization	analyzer	and	a	separate	unit	dedicated	to	detecting	the	ground-to-satellite	beacon	laser.	It	is	complimented	with	a	 small	diameter	 telescope	 that	 focuses	 the	 satellite	beacon	 laser,	 as	well	 as	 two	corner	 cubes	that	retro-reflect	the	OGS	beacon	laser.	
 Figure	4.	Schematic	 representation	of	 the	optical	module.	The	OGS	beacon	laser	at	1530	nm	is	collected	by	 the	main	 telescope	 (LCO).	After	separation	by	a	dichroic	mirror	(DBS)	 it	 is	 split,	with	part	being	send	to	the	beacon	polarization	analyzer	(consisting	of	a	polarizing	beam	splitter	(PBS)	and	 two	detectors),	 and	part	 being	 focused	 onto	 a	 quadrant	 detector	 (QD).	 The	quantum	 channel	light	at	808	nm	collected	by	 the	main	 telescope	is	sent	 towards	a	4-detector	polarization	analyzer	that	 includes	 two	 polarizing	 beam	 splitters	 (PBS),	 one	 for	 the	 {HV}	 basis,	 the	 other	 for	 the	 {DA}	basis,	 and	 one	half-wave	plate	 (HWP)	 that	 rotates	 the	polarization	 by	 45°	 for	 the	 {DA}	basis.	 The	{HV}	versus	{DA}	basis	choice	occurs	randomly	in	the	beam	splitter	(BS).	Not	shown	are	the	corner	cubes	 that	 retro-reflect	 the	 OGS	 beacon	 laser	 at	 1530	 nm,	 and	 the	 small	 diameter	 telescope	 that	directs	the	satellite’s	beacon	laser	at	1565	nm	towards	the	OGS.	The	telescope	and	the	polarization	analyzer/detection	module	are	not	at	the	same	scale.	
 
11/34 The	 light	 collection	optics	 should	maximize	 the	number	of	 photons	 captured	 from	 the	photon	stream	directed	towards	the	satellite	by	the	OGS.	Ideally,	the	OGS	produces	a	diffraction	limited	beam	diameter	of	a	 little	over	1	meter	at	 the	 location	of	 the	satellite	 for	 the	808	nm	quantum	channel;	 in	practice	 increased	to	several	meters	due	to	atmospheric	 turbulence.	 Increasing	the	receptor	 aperture	will	 directly	 result	 in	higher	 signal.	 Losses	 internal	 to	 the	quantum	channel	light	 collection	 optics	 and	 the	 polarization	 analysis	 module	 should	 also	 be	 minimized.	 The	receiver	telescope	must	preserve	the	polarization	direction	of	the	incoming	photons,	such	that	it	contributes	not	more	than	0.25%	to	the	total	polarization	error	(see	section	1.4.3).	This	signifies	that	the	receiver	telescope	is	polarization	neutral	to	the	extent	that	the	spread	in	polarization	of	beams	 taking	different	 paths	 through	 the	 telescope	will	 be	 less	 than	1°.	 Starting	point	 for	 the	optical	design	 is	a	Cassegrain	 telescope	with	an	opening	aperture	of	150	mm	diameter	and	an	overall	length	of	just	125	mm.	A	refractive	solution	was	not	considered.	Although	the	weight	of	a	lens	 system	 could	 be	 reduced	 using	 a	 Fresnel	 lens,	 strong	 accelerations	 along	 the	 optical	 axis	expected	during	launch	are	a	serious	concern,	as	is	radiation	damage	of	the	optics.	The	 Field	 Of	 View	 (FOV)	 of	 the	 quantum	 channel’s	 detectors	 (100-µm	 diameter)	 should	 in	practice	be	as	small	as	possible	while	respecting	the	constraint	of	the	dynamic	pointing	stability	of	 the	 pointing	 and	 tracking	 system	 (see	 section	 1.4.4).	 This	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 unwanted	background	light	from	being	captured	by	the	receiver	telescope.	Considering	this,	the	quantum	channel	FOV	 is	215	µrad	 (45	arcsec),	 corresponding	 to	a	 circular	 footprint	of	120	m	diameter	with	the	satellite	at	an	orbital	height	of	550	km.	Knowledge	of	the	photon	intensity	or	spectral	radiance	of	the	area	of	the	OGS	then	enables	one	to	calculate	the	expected	background	count	rate.	The	Vienna	group	made	measurements	at	the	Canary	Islands	with	a	spectral	band	pass	filter	of	10	nm	centered	at	810	nm,	resulting	in	a	photon	flux	of	1010	to	2.5·1011	s-1sr-1m-2	depending	on	the	 moon	 phase	 [27].	 Even	 at	 a	 distance	 of	 1100	 km	 between	 OGS	 and	 satellite,	 near	 the	beginning	and	end	of	 their	encounter,	 the	background	count	rate	 is	 then	still	smaller	than	400	cps	(counts	per	second),	given	a	15-cm	receiver	telescope	diameter	and	taking	an	atmospheric	attenuation	of	~3	dB	into	account;	acceptable	for	a	Bell	test	with	uplink	losses	<	50	dB	(cf.	the	calculated	 Visibility	 of	 Figure	 9).	We	 note	 that	 the	 actual	 background	 can	 be	 further	 reduced	using	bandpass	filters	with	a	narrower	transmission	profile;	3	nm	appearing	a	reasonable	choice	for	 which	 center	 wavelength	 transmission	 of	 >90%	 is	 still	 possible	 and	 outside	 bandpass	blocking	is	better	than	OD6	(60	dB).		In	order	to	compact	the	whole	instrument	while	conserving	a	small	ratio	of	the	diameters	of	the	secondary	and	primary	mirrors	(i.e.,	a	better	transmission),	a	relatively	high	field	curvature	has	been	 chosen.	 Considering	 the	 on-axis	 aberrations,	 we	 take	 benefit	 of	 the	 Cassegrain	 design,	which	enables	totally	suppressing	the	spherical	aberration	(SA3)	by	choosing	the	conic	constant	(also	known	as	the	Schwarzschild	constant)	of	the	hyperbolic	secondary	mirror.	Aberrations	are	in	general	not	critical	given	the	small	FOV	and	the	non-imaging	character	of	the	application.	In	particular,	 the	aberrations	appearing	within	 the	FOV	 (coma,	FOV	curvature,	distortion)	 can	be	neglected.	 The	 design	was	 analyzed	 in	 ray	 tracing	 software	 to	 show	 that	 a	 100-µm	 diameter	photodetector	behind	the	telescope	can	capture	more	than	80%	of	the	incoming	light	intensity.		The	FOV	of	the	beacon	detection	is	9	mrad	(see	section	1.3).	The	compact	telescope	allows	for	the	entire	optics	module	to	be	shorter	than	200	mm.			
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1.4.2. POLARIZATION	ANALYSIS	The	polarization	detection	unit	analyzes	 the	 incoming	photons	 in	either	one	of	 two	bases	 (see	Figure	3).	An	easy	and	secure	way	to	make	the	random	choice	of	selecting	either	one	of	the	two	bases	 is	 by	 the	 use	 of	 a	 50/50	 beam	 splitter	 (BS)	 [28].	 As	 pointed	 out	 by	 Gisin	 et	 al.	 [7],	 the	quantum	mechanical	nature	of	the	underlying	physical	process	guarantees	its	randomness,	but	experimental	artifacts,	notably	detector	dead-time,	afterpulsing,	and	detector	flashes	[29]	could	potentially	lead	to	correlated	adjacent	bits	at	high	photon	rates	[30,	31,	32).	Following	the	BS	a	half-wave	plate	(HWP)	oriented	at	22.5°	in	one	of	the	two	paths	is	used	to	rotate	the	polarization	direction	by	45°.	Polarizing	beam	splitters	(PBS)	in	both	paths	enable	the	polarization	analysis.	The	polarizer	extinction	ratio	and	the	orientation/mounting	precision	of	 the	PBS	are	such	that	the	probability	of	a	photon	ending	up	in	the	wrong	path	(e.g.,	a	vertically	polarized	photon	being	detected	by	the	“horizontal	detector”	instead	of	the	“vertical	detector”)	is	not	larger	than	1%,	as	such	a	detection	error	(ed)	increases	the	coincidence	error	and	therewith	reduces	the	signal-to-noise	ratio	and	visibility	(section	1.7).	Importantly,	this	error	includes	the	possible	misalignment	of	the	OGS	and	satellite	polarization	bases.		All	 quantum	 communication	 protocols	 based	 on	 polarization	 encoding	 of	 the	 qubits	 require	 a	shared	 reference	 frame	 between	 the	 transmitter	 (Alice)	 and	 receiver	 (Bob).	 Atmospheric	turbulence,	scattering,	and	the	Faraday	effect	can	potentially	rotate	the	plane	of	polarization.	It	is,	however,	 easily	 shown	 that	 these	 effects	 are	 negligible	 (<	 1	 mrad)	 compared	 to	 geometrical	effects	 due	 to	 the	 moving	 satellite	 and	 the	 moving	 mirrors	 of	 the	 transmitter	 telescope.	 The	latter	 effect	 was	 studied	 by	 Bonato	 et	 al.	 [33]	 and	 should	 be	 compensated	 by	 appropriate	rotation	of	the	polarization	bases	of	the	OGS	or	satellite.	If	these	bases	would	be	misaligned	by	4°,	this	would	 contribute	 0.48%	 to	 the	 detection	 error.	 Two	 options	 are	 available:	 The	 first	 is	 to	rotate	the	OGS	polarization	basis	(e.g.,	by	the	motorized	rotation	of	a	half-wave	plate	(HWP)	in	the	quantum	light	channel)	to	adapt	to	the	satellite	orientation.	The	latter	is	known	to	the	OGS	from	 the	pre-programmed	 flight	plan	 and	 the	 information	 received	at	 regular	 intervals	 (~100	ms)	 from	 the	 satellite’s	 star	 tracker	measurements.	 Fine-tuning	will	 take	 place	 using	 a	 signal	obtained	from	the	analysis	of	the	linear	polarization	of	the	satellite’s	beacon	laser	as	received	by	the	OGS	[34].	A	second	option	entails	rotation	of	the	satellite	about	its	seeing	axis	using	an	error	signal	derived	 from	analysis	of	 the	separately	controlled	 linear	polarization	of	 the	OGS	beacon	laser,	again	combined	with	data	from	the	star	tracker.	Both	solutions	avoid	addition	of	moving	parts	 (the	 rotatable	HWP)	 to	 the	satellite.	We	 fully	 implement	 the	 first	 solution,	but	equip	 the	satellite	with	the	hardware	required	for	the	second	option.	In	case	of	failure	of	the	first	option,	for	 example	 due	 to	 a	 satellite	 beacon	 laser	 failure,	 the	 satellite	 can	 be	 re-programmed	 to	implement	 the	 second	 solution.	 Even	 though	 the	 dynamic	 tracking	 precision	 of	 the	 ADCS	 is	generally	 significantly	worse	 about	 its	 star	 tracker	bore	 axis	 (which	 is	 parallel	 to	 the	 receiver	telescope	seeing	axis),	it	is	however	more	than	sufficient	to	allow	precise	pre-orientation	of	the	satellite	 about	 its	 seeing	 axis	 (see	 section	 1.4.5).	 The	OGS	 laser	 beacon	 signal	 is	 then	 used	 to	improve	 absolute	 accuracy	 and	 to	 further	 improve	 alignment	 precision	 to	 the	 10-µrad	 level.	Ground-based	experiments	will	verify	that	the	OGS	laser	beacon	polarization	correctly	tracks	the	orientation	of	the	OGS	polarization	bases.		The	 coincidence	 count	 rate	 shows	 a	 cos2-dependence	 when	 varying	 the	 measurement	 basis	between	HV	and	DA.	The	visibility	of	this	polarization	correlation	decreases,	not	only	due	to	the	above	mentioned	polarization	detection	error,	but	also	due	to	source	imperfections,	polarization	imbalance	in	the	quantum	link,	and	detector	dark	and	background	counts	(see	section	1.7).		
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1.4.3. SINGLE	PHOTON	DETECTORS	Based	on	the	link-budget	and	key	rate	analyses	presented	in	sections	1.6	and	1.7	we	require	the	single	photon	detectors	(SPDs)	 to	have	a	photon	detection	efficiency	(PDE)	>	40%,	dark	count	rate	(DCR)	per	detector	<	1000	cps,	 timing	 jitter	<	100	ps,	afterpulsing	<	3%,	and	a	maximum	count	 rate	 >100	 kHz	 without	 saturation	 effects.	 Afterpulsing	 will	 contribute	 to	 the	 dark-	 or	background	 count	 rate,	 and	 may	 also	 lead	 to	 a	 correlation	 between	 bits.	 The	 light	 collection	optics	have	been	designed	for	a	detector	diameter	of	100	µm.	The	 wavelength	 of	 operation	 is	 not	 a	 primary	 specification.	 Two	 wavelength	 ranges	 appear	potentially	attractive	for	free-space	QKD:	the	near-infrared	region	near	800	nm,	and	the	telecom,	short	wave	 infrared	 (SWIR)	range	around	1550	nm.	The	 link	budget	 slightly	 favors	 the	 longer	wavelength	(see	section	1.6).	Since	key	distribution	and	the	sending	of	encrypted	messages	are	in	principle	independent	aspects	of	cryptography,	there	is	no	fundamental	reason	to	operate	the	QKD	channel	on	the	same	wavelength	as	that	used	for	a	fiber-based	network	used	to	transmit	the	encrypted	message.	That	said,	if	operating	at	telecom	wavelengths	the	quantum	signal	could	be	directly	transmitted	by	fiber	from	OGS	to	“client”	for	polarization	analysis	and	detection.	There	also	remains	an	obvious	 interest	 in	mutualizing	optical	building	blocks	between	the	free-space	and	 fiber-based	 systems,	 which	 drives	 the	 exploration	 of	 the	 feasibility	 of	 QKD	 at	 1550	 nm.	However,	 currently,	 neither	 of	 the	 available	 detector	 technologies	 in	 the	 1550	 nm	 region	 is	attractive	 for	use	 in	a	CubeSat:	Both	 Indium-Gallium-Arsenide	(IGA)	APDs	as	well	as	detectors	based	 on	 Mercury-Cadmium-Telluride	 (MCT)	 technology	 require	 cooling	 to	 very	 low	temperatures	 (<	 -80	 °C).	 In	 addition,	 IGA	APDs	 have	 a	 rather	 low	 photon	 detection	 efficiency	(PDE)	<	25%,	whereas	MCT	SPDs	are	still	in	development	and	appear	to	be	hampered	by	large	DCR	[35,	36].	At	the	current	state	of	technology,	only	Silicon-based	Avalanche	Photo	Diodes	(Si-APDs)	in	the	800	nm	range	are	able	to	combine	a	sufficiently	high	PDE	and	low	jitter	with	a	low	DCR.	Si-APDs	have	been	operated	and	characterized	in	space	or	under	space	radiation	conditions.	This	 has	 clearly	 shown	 the	 need	 for	 special	 measures	 to	 keep	 the	 dark	 count	 rate	 below	acceptable	levels,	also	after	longer	times	in	a	space	environment	[37,	38,	39].	To	our	knowledge,	no	similar	space	heritage	exists	for	IGA	SPDs,	let	alone	MCT	SPDs.	The	 Si-APD	 that	was	 identified	 for	 use	 in	 the	 NanoBob	 quantum	 channel	 is	manufactured	 by	Micro-Photon	 Devices.	 In	 particular,	 the	 Red-Enhanced	 version	 of	 this	 detector	 shows	 an	improved	sensitivity	towards	800	nm	(PDE	=	40%)	and	is	also	very	attractive	as	it	combines	a	low	 reverse	 voltage	 (50	 V)	with	 low	 jitter	 (90	 ps)	 and	 dark	 count	 rate	 [40].	 Additionally,	 the	specified	low	dark	count	rate	of	25	cps	was	demonstrated	at	a	temperature	of	-5	°C,	much	higher	than	 the	 -30	 °C	 targeted	 in	 our	 system.	 We	 expect	 to	 receive	 prototypes	 of	 these	 detectors	shortly	for	radiation	testing	in	Grenoble.		We	 note	 that	 the	 DCR	 requirement	 has	 obvious	 implications	 for	 the	 detector	 operating	temperature.	However,	the	stability	of	the	detector	temperature	is	not	very	critical	for	the	QKD	experiment,	but	may	limit	the	precision	and	accuracy	that	can	be	attained	if	the	space	segment	is	to	be	used	 in	 light	pollution	mapping	mode	 (see	 section	1.1).	High	doses	of	 radiation	 in	 space	may	cause	the	DCR	to	increase	over	time.	For	this	reason	the	detectors	are	shielded	by	housing	them	 in	 an	 aluminum	module	 with	 walls	 of	 minimally	 10-mm	 thickness,	 as	 well	 as	 by	 other	satellite	components	around	it	(batteries,	electronics,	the	aluminum	CubeSat	structure,	and	solar	panels).	Using	 the	OMERE	 software	 package	 [41]	we	 calculated	 the	 cumulative	 total	 radiation	
14/34 dose	received	by	the	detectors	as	a	function	of	the	thickness	of	the	aluminum	shielding	provided	by	the	mounting	structure.	The	satellite	was	assumed	to	be	in	an	SSO	at	550	km	with	a	launch	date	in	September	2020.	The	results	for	a	1-year	and	a	3-year	exposure	are	shown	in	Figure	5.	The	 total	 incident	 radiation	 dose	 includes	 contributions	 from	 electrons	 trapped	 in	 Earth’s	magnetic	field,	solar	and	trapped	protons,	and	Gamma	photons	(in	order	of	decreasing	radiation	level).	Kodet	 et	 al.	 [42]	determined	 that	 gamma	radiation	has	no	detrimental	 effect	on	Si-APD	performance,	and	in	any	case	in	our	mission	scenario	the	gamma	radiation	dose	accounts	for	just	1‰	of	the	total.	Anisimova	and	colleagues	tested	several	different	Si-APDs	shielded	by	10	mm	of	aluminum	under	similar	radiation	exposures	and	found	the	DCR	of	the	small	area	to	increase	to	several	 hundred	 cps	 [39].	 Packing	 the	 detector	 unit	 in	 a	 hydrogen-rich	 material	 such	 a	polyethylene	 may	 further	 reduce	 the	 total	 radiation	 dose.	 This	 will	 be	 part	 of	 the	 radiation	testing	of	the	above-mentioned	prototype	detectors.			
	
	It	has	been	shown	that	annealing	of	Si-APD	detectors	at	elevated	temperature	(60	to	100	°C)	for	several	tens	of	minutes	can	already	lower	the	dark	count	rate	significantly	(up	to	about	an	order	of	magnitude	decrease)	[37,	39,	42].	For	this	reason,	it	may	actually	be	advantageous	to	let	the	detectors	heat	up	during	the	daytime	part	of	the	orbit.	In	 fact,	 the	 detectors	 will	 be	 cooled	 passively	 during	 the	 nighttime	 part	 of	 the	 orbit	 using	 a	radiator	 facing	deep	space.	Small	 local	heaters	will	be	used	 to	 regulate	 the	 individual	detector	temperatures	to	-30+/-1	°C.	We	thus	do	not	use	thermo	electric	cooling	(TEC)	of	the	detectors,	also	not	 for	 final	stage	cooling	or	as	a	temperature	fine-tuning	solution.	This	comes	with	some	notable	advantages:	TEC	units	are	notoriously	inefficient	with	a	low	coefficient	of	performance.	More	problematic	appears	 the	risk	of	 total	or	partial	 failure	of	 the	TEC	or	 its	power	supply,	 in	which	 case	 the	 TEC	 unit	would	 act	 as	 a	 thermal	 insulator	 between	 the	 detector	 chip	 and	 the	mounting	 structure.	The	TEC	unit	would	also	 introduce	a	mechanically	 less	 rigid	element	 that	may	 affect	 detector	 positioning.	 Relying	 solely	 on	 passive	 cooling	 and	 low-power	 resistive	heating	thus	increases	the	reliability	of	the	detector	thermal	management	system.	
Figure	5.	The	effect	of	radiation	shielding	by	the	aluminum	detector	housing	on	the	total	cumulative	radiation	dose	for	exposures	of	1	and	3	years	as	calculated	by	the	Omere	software	package	[41].	The	satellite	is	assumed	to	be	in	a	550-km	SSO	starting	September	2020.		
 
15/34 To	study	the	passive	cooling	of	the	detector	module	in	some	detail	we	modeled	the	spacecraft	as	a	 square	 cuboid	of	 size	22	x	22	x	34	 cm3.	 Its	panels	 are	 covered	with	 a	multi-layer	 insulation	(MLI)	 characterized	 by	 an	 IR	 emissivity	 of	 0.71	 and	 a	 UV	 absorptivity	 of	 0.52,	 whereas	 the	radiator	is	coated	white	with	an	IR	emissivity	of	0.81	and	UV	absorptivity	of	0.25.	The	average	spacecraft	temperature	in	a	550	km	SSO	is	taken	to	be	10	°C.	The	detector	unit	is	modeled	as	an	aluminum	 block	 connected	 to	 the	 radiator	 with	 a	 thermally	 conductive	 strand	 with	 a	 total	resistance	of	3.2	K/W.	Each	of	the	four	detectors	and	its	proximity	electronic	circuitry	consumes	0.3W.	The	 incoming	direct	solar	UV/VIS	radiation,	 the	reflected	radiation	 from	Earth’s	surface,	and	 Earth’s	 emitted	 IR	 radiation	 during	 a	 typical	 QKD	 orbital	 scenario	 with	 nighttime	 OGS	encounter	was	calculated	using	Airbus’	Thermica	software	[43].	Taking	further	into	account	the	different	radiative	and	conductive	heat	 fluxes	between	the	satellite	structure,	 the	radiator,	and	the	detector	unit,	the	model	developed	allows	us	to	calculate	the	minimum	radiator	surface	area	needed	to	maintain	the	detector	module	temperature	below	-30	°C.	Depending	on	whether	the	radiator	is	placed	on	the	square	end-panel	facing	deep	space	(the	panel	that	also	accommodates	the	star	tracker)	or	on	one	of	the	space	facing	side	panels,	the	calculated	required	surface	area	varies	 between	 0.052	 and	 0.055	m2.	 In	 practice	 the	 radiator	 area	will	 be	 distributed	 over	 the	end-face	and	one	or	two	side	panels.	Maximizing	the	radiator	area	to	the	available	0.19	m2	may	enable	cooling	of	 the	detectors	to	a	 lower	temperature	still.	This	 is	clearly	 favorable	 in	 light	of	the	recent	findings	that	show	that	deep	cooling	drastically	reduces	and	even	mitigates	the	effects	of	radiation	[39].			
1.4.4. TIME	TAGGING	The	 events	 detected	 by	 the	 Bob	 quantum	 receiver	 can	 be	 due	 to	 detector	 dark	 counts,	background	 (stray)	 light,	 or	 the	 entangled	 photons	 sent	 by	 the	 OGS.	 Identification	 of	 the	entangled	photons	is	done	by	comparing	their	time	of	arrival	at	the	NanoBob	quantum	receiver	with	the	arrival	times	of	the	other	photon	of	the	entangled	pair	at	the	Alice	detection	unit	at	the	OGS.	 Such	 identification	 through	 coincidence	 timing	 requires	 a	 high	 timing	 precision	 if	 large	numbers	of	photons	are	 involved.	With	a	 source	 single	photon	generation	 rate	of	100	Mcps,	 a	timing	 resolution	 (coincidence	 time	 window)	 better	 than	 about	 1	 ns	 is	 required	 in	 order	 to	reduce	 the	 probability	 of	 accidental	 coincidence	 to	 an	 acceptable	 minimum.	 A	 better	 timing	resolution	 will	 thus	 increase	 the	 signal-to-noise	 ratio	 (see	 section	 1.4.2)	 by	 suppressing	 the	number	 of	 background	 or	 dark	 counts	 being	 accidentally	 registered	 as	 an	 entangled	 photon	event.		In	order	 to	 time	stamp	the	photon	arrival	a	 time-tagging	module	 is	used,	both	at	 the	OGS	[44]	and	on	 the	CubeSat.	An	 integrated	 space-qualified	 system	will	be	 specifically	designed	using	a	dedicated	 integrated	 circuit	 implementing	 time-to-digital	 conversion	 (TDC).	 A	 short-term	stability	 of	 the	 TDC	 oscillator	 of	 0.1	 ppb	 (10-10)	 is	 required,	 corresponding	 to	 a	measurement	precision	of	about	10	ps	 for	an	average	 time	between	photon	arrivals	 that	could	be	as	 long	as	roughly	100	ms	(10	cps).	This	can	be	achieved	using	an	oven	controlled	crystal	oscillator	(see,	e.g.,	[45])	or	miniature	atomic	clock	(such	as,	e.g.,	the	model	Quantum	SA45.s	by	MicroSemi	[46]).	Long-term	 clock	 synchronization	 between	 OGS	 and	 satellite	 is	 then	 achieved	 by	 the	 fore-mentioned	 time	 correlation	 technique	 applied	 repeatedly	 on	 data	 over	 intervals	 of	approximately	100	ms	[25,	44].	Implementing	TDC	with	a	time	resolution	<	25	ps	and	jitter	<	10	ps	 in	 integrated	circuitry	 is	challenging	but	can	be	done	 in	standard	field	programmable	gated	
16/34 arrays	(FPGAs)	using	a	method	based	on	self-timed	rings	(STR)	[47].	Alternatively,	Vernier-TDC	will	be	employed	if	the	compact	STR-based	approach	turns	out	to	be	too	difficult	to	implement	in	an	FPGA.		The	combined	contribution	to	the	coincidence	time	window	of	the	detector	and	electronics	jitter	on	the	space	segment,	and	those	of	a	state-of-the-art	OGS	[44],	is	about	100	ps.		
1.4.5. POSITION,	ACQUISITION	AND	TRACKING	A	first	concern	for	the	PAT	of	the	satellite	is	whether	the	precision	of	its	ADCS	is	sufficient,	also	under	 dynamical	 conditions.	 For	 a	 circular	 orbit	 at	 an	 altitude	 of	 550	 km	 the	 slewing	 rate	required	to	keep	the	line	of	sight	of	the	satellite	along	the	line	segment	from	OGS	to	satellite	is	reaches	a	maximum	value	of	~12.6	mrad/s	=	0.72°/s	at	closet	approach	(0°	zenith	angle).	The	slewing	rate	required	of	the	OGS	telescope	to	track	the	satellite	reaches	a	maximum	value	of	13.7	mrad/s	 =	 0.79°/s.	 These	 values	 are	 compatible	 with	 OGS	 telescopes	 designed	 to	 track	 LEO	satellites,	 such	 as	 the	 ESA	OGS	 “Observatorio	 del	 Teide”	 at	 Tenerife,	 situated	 at	 an	 altitude	 of	2.393	m,	and	also	less	stringent	than	the	capabilities	of	the	best	commercial	CubeSat	ADCSs.	The	 current	 demonstrated	 state-of-the-art	 in	 terms	 of	 attitude	 determination	 and	 control	appears	to	be	held	by	the	XACT	family	of	ADCS	manufactured	by	Blue	Canyon	Technologies	[48].	Their	 XACT-15	module	was	 integrated	 in	 the	MinXSS	 3U	 CubeSat	 [49],	 launched	December	 6,	2015	 and	 the	 RAVAN	 3U	 CubeSat	 [50],	 launched	 November	 11,	 2016.	 On	 MinXSS	 it	 has	demonstrated	 to	 exceed	 its	 specifications	 of	 a	 pointing	 accuracy	 <	 50	 µrad	 (11	 arcsec)	 and	 a	pointing	knowledge	<	30	µrad	(6	arcsec)	(both	1-sigma)	for	the	two	cross-star	tracker-bore	sight	axes.	 The	 pointing	 accuracy	 about	 the	 bore	 axis	 is	 specified	 to	 be	 <	 120	 µrad	 (25	 arcsec).	Furthermore,	the	dynamic	tracking	error	(1-sigma)	of	the	XACT	unit	as	a	function	of	the	slewing	rate	 for	 the	 two	 cross	 axes	 is	 largely	 unaffected	 for	 slewing	 rates	 <	 1.1°/s.	 Even	 the	 dynamic	tracking	error	about	the	bore	sight	axis	does	not	exceed	480	µrad	(100	arcsec),	which	is	still	well	within	our	requirements.	For	the	Blue	Canyon	XACT-50,	which	is	identical	to	the	XACT-15,	except	for	its	larger	50	mNms	reaction	wheels,	to	guarantee	a	slewing	rate	of	at	least	1	°/s	in	any	axis,	the	moment	of	inertia	in	the	slewing	axes	needs	to	be	below	2.8	kgm2.	The	predicted	moments	of	inertia	of	the	NanoBob	satellite	are	about	one-twentieth	of	this	value.		At	a	satellite	altitude	of	550	km	it	takes	the	beacon	laser	photons	at	least	1.83	ms	to	arrive	at	the	satellite.	 During	 this	 time	 the	 angular	 displacement	 of	 the	 satellite,	 as	 seen	 from	 the	 OGS	telescope	 position,	 could	 be	 as	 much	 as	 25	 µrad.	 This	 is	 non-negligible	 with	 respect	 to	 the	telescope	FOV	and	will	have	to	be	taken	into	account	in	its	tracking	control.	Similarly	the	satellite	attitude	will	need	to	slightly	point	ahead	of	the	acquired	OGS	position.		
1.4.6. BEACON	LASERS	Knowledge	of	 the	attitude	(orientation)	of	 the	satellite	 is	 typically	 limited	 to	about	50	µrad	by	star	tracker	performance.	While	this	is	almost	an	order	of	magnitude	smaller	than	the	satellite’s	quantum	 channel	 FOV,	 this	 may	 not	 be	 sufficient	 for	 accurate	 pointing	 due	 to	 ephemeris	uncertainty	 that	 limits	 the	 ability	 to	 accurately	 transfer	 the	 attitude	 knowledge	 in	 the	 inertial	frame	to	the	Earth-fixed	frame.	On	the	other	hand,	the	OGS	requires	accurate	knowledge	of	the	satellite	position	in	the	Earth-fixed	frame	in	order	to	accurately	track	the	satellite.	For	the	same	
17/34 reason	as	before,	data	from	the	star	tracker	may	not	be	precise	enough.	The	positioning	error	of	a	Commercial-Of-The-Shelf	(COTS)	GPS	receiver	can	be	as	large	as	10	m	[51],	even	though	sub-meter	precision	has	been	shown	on	a	LEO	spacecraft	[52].	This,	however,	could	already	put	the	satellite	out	of	sight	of	the	OGS,	considering	that	even	in	the	presence	of	atmospheric	turbulence	a	1-m	diameter	 telescope	would	 illuminate	 a	disk	with	 a	diameter	of	 just	 a	 few	meters	 at	 the	altitude	of	the	satellite.		To	provide	an	additional,	and	more	accurate	way	 to	align	both	 the	OGS	 telescope	and	satellite	receiver	we	will	 implement	 a	 two-way	beacon	 (guide	 star)	 system,	 allowing	 for	 relatively	 fast	closed-loop	control	of	the	satellite	attitude,	as	well	as	satellite	tracking	by	the	OGS	telescope.	The	beacon	receiver	module	on	the	space	segment	includes	a	quadrant	detector	(or	alternatively	or	CCD	camera)	to	enable	attitude	control	about	the	two	axes	perpendicular	to	the	line	of	sight,	and	a	linear	polarization	analyzer	made	up	of	a	polarizing	beamsplitter	and	two	IGA	photodetectors.		The	initial	choice	of	wavelength	for	the	beacon	lasers	 is	 in	the	NIR	C-band	around	1550	nm	as	here	efficient	lasers	and	detectors	are	easily	available	and	the	atmospheric	transmission	is	high.	Moreover,	 the	 wavelength	 is	 retina-safe,	 and	 directly	 compatible	 with	 existing	telecommunication	 hardware	 and	 infrastructure.	 It	 is	 also	 advantageous	 that	 optical	communication	 in	 space	has	been	demonstrated	previously	 in	 this	wavelength	 range	 [53].	We	therefore	aim	to	use	the	beacon	lasers	not	only	for	PAT,	but	also	for	fast	optical	communication	by	implementing	a	pulse	position	modulation	scheme	[54].	Optical	communication	provides	an	attractive	alternative	to	RF	communication	by	virtue	of	 its	 lower	power	demand	and	high	data	rate.	The	 use	 of	 a	 beacon	 laser	 and	 optical	 communication	 using	 a	 laser	 beam	 between	 a	 ground	station	and	a	LEO	CubeSat	have	been	separately	 investigated	by	other	groups	[55,	56,	57].	We	will	implement	a	very	similar	design	as	those	explored	by	the	groups	mentioned	here,	and	DLR	in	particular	[55].	It	should	be	noted	that	the	uplink	experiences	a	higher	link	loss	(by	about	10	dB)	due	 to	atmospheric	 turbulence,	but	 that	 this	could	be	compensated	by	 the	use	of	a	higher	power	laser.	The	downlink	experiences	lower	losses	and	the	OGS	can	be	equipped	with	a	large	diameter	 receiver	 (or	 use	 the	 Coudé	 focus	 of	 the	 main	 telescope)	 as	 well	 as	 cooled	 high-sensitivity	 detectors,	 together	 allowing	 for	 the	 use	 of	 a	 relatively	 low	power	 laser	 source	 and	small	 transmitter	 telescope	 on	 the	 space	 segment.	 Finally,	 we	 note	 the	 encouraging	 result	reported	in	[58]	that	the	large	difference	in	quantum	channel	and	beacon	laser	wavelength	does	not	preclude	using	the	beacon	laser	at	1550	nm	to	correct	the	turbulence-induced	beam	wander	at	the	quantum	channel	wavelength	of	808	nm	(employing,	e.g.,	a	fast	steering	mirror	on	the	OGS	or	its	adaptive	optics	system	[59]).		
1.5. GROUND	STATION	AND	ENTANGLED	PHOTON	SOURCE	A	number	of	telescopes	that	satisfy	the	needs	of	the	experiment	have	been	identified	[27].	The	most	 promising	 of	 these	 is	 the	 ESA	 OGS	 at	 Tenerife.	 Equipped	with	 a	 100-cm	 telescope,	 it	 is	capable	of	tracking	a	satellite	in	LEO	with	a	pointing	precision	of	1.2	µrad	starting	at	relatively	low	elevation	angle	(~15°).	In	order	to	characterize	the	strength	of	the	atmospheric	turbulence	above	 the	 telescope,	 the	Fried	parameter	r0	 (a.k.a.	 the	atmospheric	 coherence	width)	 [60]	has	been	measured	at	the	RoboDIMM	ORM	telescope	on	the	Canary	Islands	over	a	8.5-year	period,	showing	that,	on	average,	about	112	days	per	year	r0	>	20	cm	(λ=810	nm)	(Fig.	6)	[44].	The	OGS	telescope	aperture	is	in	fact	generally	larger	than	the	average	Fried	parameter	for	the	location	of	
18/34 the	 OGS,	 such	 that	 the	 beam	 size	 at	 the	 position	 of	 the	 satellite	 is	 not	 diffraction	 limited,	 but	rather	limited	by	atmospheric	turbulence.	The	 optical	 ground	 station	 will	 be	 equipped	 with	 an	entangled	 photon	 source	 and	 the	 associated	 Alice	detection	module	to	enable	the	implementation	of	the	E91	 QKD	 protocol	 with	 the	 qubits	 encoded	 in	 linear	polarization	 states	 of	 the	 photons	 [44].	 The	experiment	 is	 based	 on	 photon	 pairs	 produced	 by	spontaneous	 parametric	 down	 conversion	 (SPDC).	This	nonlinear	process	consists	of	splitting	one	photon	with	energy	hνp	into	two	lower	energy	photons	at	hνs	(signal)	 and	 hνi	 (idler)	 inside	 a	 nonlinear	 crystal	exhibiting	 a	 strong	 second-order	 electric	susceptibility	χ(2).	The	pair	of	photons	 that	 is	created	can	 exhibit	 entanglement	 when	 they	 are	indistinguishable	in	terms	of	their	momentum	vectors.	SPDC	 is	 not	 very	 efficient.	 The	 Vienna	 source	 can	generate	up	to	about	8·106	pairs	per	second	per	mW	of	pump	power,	for	a	maximum	pair	generation	rate	of	3·108	 s-1	 [4].	 Improving	 the	 brightness	 of	 the	 source	would	 enable	 increasing	 the	 key	 rate	 of	 the	 QKD	protocol	(see	section	1.7).			
1.6. LINK	BUDGET	We	estimate	 the	average	 link	attenuation	between	the	OGS	and	the	satellite	receiver	using	 the	following	formula	[61]:		 𝐴 = !²(!²!!!²!"#)!²! !!!(!!!!)!! 10!!"#!" 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1)	Here,	L	is	the	link	distance	between	the	OGS	and	the	satellite,	DR	is	the	receiver	diameter,	TR	and	
TT	are	the	transmission	factors	of	the	receiver	and	transmitter	telescopes,	respectively.	LP	is	the	pointing	 loss	 due	 to	misalignment,	 and	Aatm	 is	 the	 atmospheric	 attenuation	 due	 to	 (Rayleigh)	scattering	 and	 absorption	 (expressed	 in	 dB)	 that	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 path	 length	 through	 the	atmosphere	and	thus	the	zenith	angle	ζ:	Aatm	=	Aatm,0(L/h)	≈	Aatm,0/cos(ζ),	where	h	is	the	height	of	the	satellite	orbit,	Aatm,0	equals	3	dB	at	808	nm	and	2	dB	at	1550	nm.	The	angles	θT	and	θatm	are	respectively	the	diffraction	limited	and	atmospheric	turbulence	induced	divergence	angles	of	the	transmitter	telescope	that	are	assumed	to	add	quadratically.	We	define	these	two	“seeing”	angles	as	follows:		 𝜃! = 2.44 !!!	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)	and		 𝜃!"# = 2.1 !!!	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3)	The	definition	of	θT	differs	from	the	one	given	Pfennigbauer	et	al.	[61],	who	used	θT	=	1.22	λ/DT.	Since	 we	 do	 not	 want	 to	 underestimate	 the	 effect	 of	 atmospheric	 turbulence,	 we	 use	 the	definition	of	Eq	(2),	such	that	L·θT	corresponds	to	the	full	diameter	of	the	central	spot	in	the	Airy	diffraction	pattern	(defined	by	the	first	zero-crossing	of	the	Airy	function),	instead	of	its	radius.	
Figure 6. Histogram of the Fried 
parameter at 810 nm, based on 
observations from Jan. 2, 2009 to April 22, 
2017 at the Observatorio del Roque de los 
Muchachos (ORM) at La Palma [44]. The 
histogram includes 228 days per year; 
during the remaining 137 days no 
measurements were possible due to 
overcast or technical problems. During 112 
days/year r0 > 20 cm (green area in the 
histogram).  
 
19/34 For	the	same	reason	we	use	the	original	definition	of	Eq.	(3)	for	θatm,	even	though	some	authors	(including	[60])	have	used	θatm	=	λ/r0,	thus	without	the	factor	of	2.1,	which	equals	the	ratio	of	the	spatial	coherence	radius	ρ0	to	the	Fried	parameter	r0	[60].			The	Fried	parameter	 r0	corresponds	 to	 the	diameter	of	 the	diffraction	 limited	 telescope	 in	 the	absence	of	atmospheric	 turbulence	 that	would	yield	 the	same	resolution	as	a	 telescope	with	a	diameter	much	 larger	 than	r0	but	 in	 the	presence	of	 the	 turbulent	atmosphere	 [62].	 It	may	be	written	as	[63]:	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4)	where	 	is	the	(temperature-dependent)	atmospheric	turbulence	strength	at	the	position	z	along	the	light	path.	When	the	path	is	a	straight	line	along	a	zenith	angle	ζ,	the	path	is	longer	by	a	factor	approximately	equal	to	1/cos(ζ),	leading	to	a	smaller	Fried	parameter:		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (5)	Eq.	 (4)	 shows	 that	 the	 Fried	 parameter	 increases	with	wavelength:	 .	 Consequently,	 an	atmospheric	 turbulence	 limited	 telescope	 will	 have	 a	 seeing	 that	 improves	 slightly	 with	wavelength	(i.e.,	θatm	becomes	smaller;	from	808	to	1550	nm	the	seeing	improves	by	14%).		Evaluating	Eq	 (1)	 for	 two	orbital	 scenarios,	 one	 in	which	 the	 satellite	passes	directly	over	 the	OGS,	 and	one	 in	which	 it	passes	at	 a	ground	 track	distance	of	500	km,	as	well	 as	 for	different	values	of	 the	Fried	parameter,	allows	us	 to	present	 in	Figure	7	curves	of	 the	expected	average	link	attenuation	as	a	 function	of	 time.	Table	2	summarizes	the	values	of	 the	model	parameters	used	to	prepare	Figure	7.	
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Figure	7.	Link	losses	for	two	different	orbital	scenarios:	(a)	The	lower	(black)	curve	for	a	passage	directly	over	the	OGS	and	the	upper	(blue)	curve	for	a	ground	track	that	passes	at	a	distance	of	500	km	from	the	OGS.	The	solid	curves	give	the	losses	for	atmospheric	turbulence	characterized	by	a	Fried	parameter	r0=20	cm	at	808	nm,	whereas	the	shaded	bands	correspond	to	the	range	of	15	cm	<	r0	<	25	cm.		(b)	The	same	as	(a)	for	the	solid	curves,	and	in	addition	the	corresponding	curves	for	the	link	budget	at	1550	nm	(same	atmospheric	conditions,	corresponding	to	r0=	44	cm	at	1550	nm).	The	horizontal	dashed	line	indicates	the	link	loss	limit	of	45	dB	for	which	the	experiment	duration	that	QKD	would	be	possible	is	calculated.	
20/34 Under	conditions	of	very	low	atmospheric	turbulence	(r0	>=	30	cm	at	810	nm,	>=	65	cm	at	1550	nm),	the	link	attenuation	is	always	smaller	than	45	dB	during	the	240	s	of	the	orbit	reserved	for	the	QKD	 experiment.	 Figure	 6	 shows	 that	 such	 favorable	 conditions	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 occur	only	about	9	days	per	year	at	the	ESA	OGS	at	the	Canary	Islands.	Accepting	stronger	atmospheric	turbulence	(r0	=20	cm	at	810	nm,	40	cm	at	1550	nm)	means	that	the	link	attenuation	descends	below	45	dB	for	a	smaller	fraction	of	the	flight	time,	reducing	the	time	available	for	QKD	to	about	200	s	and	140	s	for	the	direct	overpass	and	the	distant	passing,	respectively.	Such	conditions	can	be	expected	during	about	112	days	per	year	(cf.	Figure	6).			 	 	 	 Table	2.	Link	attenuation	parameters	
λ	 808	nm	/	1550	nm	
Aatm,0	 3	dB	/	2	dB	
DR	 15	cm	
DT	 100	cm	
TR,	TT	 0.8	
LP	 0.2	
h	 550	km		The	 link	 budget	 has	 direct	 consequences	 for	 the	 required	 data	 storage	 and	 transmission	bandwidth.	The	OGS	generates	roughly	R=108	(entangled)	photon	pairs	per	second.	Assuming	a	lower	 limit	 of	 40	 dB	 average	 uplink	 losses	 (combined	 geometric	 and	 turbulence	 losses),	 this	means	that	the	satellite	receives	on	average	up	to	RE=104	photons	per	second.	These	need	to	all	be	time	tagged	with	a	resolution	δt	better	than	the	width	of	the	coincidence	time	window	τ,	itself	limited	by	detector	jitter.	The	(uncompressed)	number	of	bits	that	need	to	be	stored	with	each	detector	event	is	thus:		 	 bits = log2 hδt⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟+ 2 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (6)	where	h	is	the	experiment	duration	(“horizon”)	for	which	a	unique	time	stamp	is	required,	and	the	 final	 term	 accounts	 for	 the	 storage	 of	 the	 polarization	 information	 (basis	 and	 one	 of	 two	orthogonal	directions).	The	number	of	bytes	 is	 then	obtained	as	bytes	=	RE·(bits/8).	Taking	the	rather	conservative	values	of	h	=	6	months	and	δt	=	25	ps,	we	obtain	bits	=	61.1,	or	64	bits	after	rounding	off.	The	byte	rate	is	then	80	kB/s.	For	a	typical	experiment	of	<	5	minutes	duration	this	requires	storage	of	24	Mbytes	per	experiment.	With	a	maximum	of	3	passes	per	day,	this	comes	to	72	MB	per	day.	To	this	one	needs	to	add	house	keeping	data	such	as	critical	temperatures,	GPS	and	star	tracker	data,	etc.,	that	however	can	be	sampled	at	much	lower	rate,	e.g.,	just	once	every	second.	Even	if	this	would	be	done	continuously	throughout	the	orbital	cycles,	this	would	require	about	12	MB	per	day	to	store	64	values	with	2-byte	resolution.	These	numbers	are	conservative	estimates	also	because	in	practice	the	data	will	be	compressed	before	transmission.	E.g.,	only	the	first	event	of	each	experiment	requires	a	full	time	stamp,	all	subsequent	events	can	be	stamped	relative	to	the	first,	saving	roughly	16	bits	per	event,	already	a	25%	reduction	in	data	volume.	It	is	noted	that	the	processing	power	required	to	generate	the	secure	key	on	board	of	the	satellite	is	not	excessive	and	easily	handled	by,	e.g.,	a	COTS	solution	incorporating	a	Zync-based	on-board	computer	(OBC).			
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1.7. KEY	RATE		We	have	performed	a	study	of	the	expected	key	rate	using	a	model	developed	by	Ma,	Fong,	and	Lo	for	QKD	with	an	entangled	photon	source	based	on	spontaneous	parametric	down	conversion	(SPDC)	[64].	The	model	provides	an	expression	for	the	coincidence	detection	probability	given	a	source	photon	(referred	to	as	a	“pulse”	in	the	original	paper):	
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2 	 	 	 	 (7)	Here	µ	is	the	average	number	of	photon	pairs	produced	for	one	source	photon	(µ	<	1),	ηX	is	the	detection	efficiency	of	channel	X	(=A	for	Alice,	or	B	for	Bob),	and	Y0X	is	the	probability	of	a	dark-	or	 background	 count	 in	 channel	 X	 within	 the	 coincidence	 time	 τ	 (s).	 For	 a	 system	 with	 Ndet	detectors,	a	dark	count	rate	of	DX	(X=A,B),	and	a	background	(e.g.,	due	to	stray	light,	poor	filtering	of	beacon	light,	or	other	light	pollution	sources	within	the	FOV	of	the	receiver	telescope)	count	rate	of	B	(s-1)	in	Bob’s	channel,	we	can	write:	
	 Y0A = NdetDAτY0B = NdetDB +B( )τ 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (8)	As	 in	 the	 following	we	will	vary	 the	value	of	 the	dark	count	rate	DB,	we	note	here	 that	 for	 the	purpose	of	the	simulation,	an	increase	of	the	dark	count	rate	DB	by	and	amount	ΔD	is	equivalent	to	changing	the	background	count	rate	B	by	Ndet·ΔD	(=	4ΔD).	The	coincidence	rate	then	equals	Q	times	the	source	photon	(singles)	production	rate	(equal	to	the	inverse	of	the	coincidence	time	window,	since	the	pair	production	probability	is	already	included	in	Q):	
	 Rcoinc = 1τ⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟Q(µ) 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (9)	We	 note	 that	 the	 coincidence	 rate	 is	 inversely	 proportional	 to	 the	 link	 attenuation	 until	 the	visibility	decreases	and	the	Quantum	Bit	Error	Rate	(QBER)	increases.	This	is	because	dark-	and	background	counts	at	the	NanoBob	receiver	could	accidentally	coincide	with	photon	detection	at	the	sender	side	(Alice,	at	the	OGS),	 increasing	the	QBER,	and	adding	to	the	number	of	detected	coincidences.	The	rate	at	which	this	occurs	can	be	estimated	as	Nacc	=	Nt	×	Nr	×	τ	=	(ηA	R)	×	(ηB	R	/	
A)	×	τ.	Here	Nt	is	the	rate	of	events	detected	at	the	sender	side,	Nr	the	rate	of	events	detected	at	the	receiver	side,	R	 the	rate	of	pair	production,	and	A	 the	link	attenuation.	For	example,	with	a	pair	production	rate	of	R	=	108	s-1,	coincidence	time	window	τ		=	10-9	s,	and	detection	efficiency	of	η	=	0.32,	this	gives	Nacc	≈	10	cps	at	a	link	attenuation	of	50	dB,	assuming	that	the	sum	of	dark-	and	background	count	rates	<<	Nr	=	320	cps.	But	if	the	sum	of	dark	and	background	count	rates	(4DB+B)	 is	 high,	 say	 5000	 cps,	 Nacc	 ≈	 50	 cps	 (on	 a	 total	 coincidence	 rate	 of	 63	 cps	 at	 a	 link	attenuation	of	50	dB).		The	secret	key	rate	 is	 lower	 than	 the	coincidence	rate	since	 the	sequence	of	coincidences	 (the	“raw	key”)	still	contains	wrong	bits	that	need	to	be	removed	using	some	kind	of	error	correction.	Also,	in	order	to	decrease	the	amount	of	information	that	Eve	may	have	been	able	to	obtain,	Alice	and	Bob	engage	in	a	process	known	as	privacy	amplification	that	further	reduces	the	number	of	bits	available	for	the	construction	of	a	secret	key	(see,	e.g.	[7],	[8]).	Ma	et	al.	provide	a	lower	limit	of	the	secret	key	generation	(“distillation”)	efficiency	due	to	post-processing	[64]:	
	 Rdist (QBER) ≥ q 1− f (QBER)H2 (QBER)−H2 (QBER)( ) 	 		 	 	 	 (10)	
22/34 where	 q	 represents	 the	 basis	 reconciliation	 factor,	 in	 our	 protocol	 equal	 to	 0.5,	 f(x)	 is	 the	bidirectional	 error	 correction	 efficiency,	 and	H2(x)	 is	 the	 binary	 entropy	 function:	H2(x)	 :=	 –x	log2(x)	–	(1–x)	log2(1–x).	In	the	Shannon	limit,	f(QBER)	=	1	and	the	secret	key	generation	fraction	reaches	zero	for	QBER	→	11.0%	[7,	64,	65].	Here,	again	conservatively,	we	follow	[64]	in	taking	
f(QBER)	 =	 1.22,	 in	 which	 case	 the	 function	 reaches	 zero	 for	 QBER	 =	 9.4%	 and	 secret	 key	distillation	is	no	longer	possible.	However,	the	secret	key	rate	is	only	a	factor	of	5	lower	than	the	coincidence	rate	if	the	QBER	≈	5%.	Only	if	the	QBER	exceeds	8%,	does	the	secret	key	rate	drop	quickly	towards	zero.		The	 QBER	 could	 be	 measured	 directly	 in	 the	 QKD	 experiment,	 but	 can	 also	 be	 calculated	 as	follows	[64]:		
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	 	 	 	 (11)	We	start	our	analysis	by	considering	the	conservative	scenario	given	by	the	parameters	of	Table	3.	Notably,	we	consider	that	the	source	produces	108	pairs	per	second,	and	that	the	coincidence	time	window	is	limited	to	1	ns.	This	can	easily	be	met	by	currently	existing	sources	and	detection	systems	that	can	be	integrated	on	the	OGS.	We	further	assume	a	background	count	rate	of	400	cps.	Figure	8	then	shows	that	with	a	dark	count	rate	of	100	cps	per	detector,	the	experiment	can	tolerate	a	total	 link	 loss	up	to	about	47	dB,	and	that	this	 limit	 is	reduced	to	about	40	dB	if	 the	dark	count	rate	reaches	1000	cps.	The	same	figure	also	shows	the	behavior	of	the	signal-to-noise	ratio,	defined	as	SNR	=	(Nmax-	Nmin)/Nmin,	with	Nmin	(Nmax)	the	coincidence	count	rate	measured	at	the	 minimum	 (maximum)	 of	 the	 polarization	 correlation	 curve.	 The	 SNR	 may	 be	 calculated	directly	from	knowledge	of	the	QBER:	SNR	=	(1/QBER)-1.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure 8. The calculated QBER and SNR as a function of the link losses for two different dark count 
rates (solid red curve: 100 cps; dotted blue curve: 1000 cps per detector). All other parameters are as in 
Table 3. No secret key distillation is possible if the QBER exceeds 9.4% (SNR > 9.6) for the case that 
the bidirectional error correction efficiency f equals 1.22 (dashed horizontal green line). The 
corresponding SNR is shown on the right y-axis (solid purple: 100 cps; dashed light blue: 1000 cps dark 
count rate). 
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	 Table	3.	Parameters	of	the	QKD	model	for	a	conservative	source	performance	
q	 basis	reconciliation	factor		 0.5	 	
f(E)	 bidirectional	error	correction	function	 1	 	
τ coincidence	time	window	 1	 ns	
µ	 average	number	of	photons	per	pulse	 0.1	 	
DA	 OGS	dark	count	rate	per	detector	 100	 cps	
DB	 satellite	dark	count	rate	per	detector	 >	100	 cps	
B	 satellite	background	count	rate	 400	 cps	
Ndet	 number	of	detectors	 4	 	
PDE	 Photon	Detection	Efficiency	of	satellite	single	
photon	detectors	[40]	 0.4	 	
ηA	 OGS	overall	detection	efficiency	[44]	 0.6				 	
ηB	 ηB	=	PDE·10-A/10,	with	A	the	quantum	channel	
link	attenuation	in	dB	
	 	
e0	 error	 probability	 of	 dark-	 and	 background	
counts	
0.5	 	
ed	 error	 probability	 of	 photon	 arriving	 on	
wrong	detector	(polarization	error)	
0.01	 	
	
		The	QBER	 increases	 and	 the	 visibility	 of	 the	 polarization	 correlation	 curve	 (see	 section	 1.4.2)	decreases	with	link	attenuation,	as	well	as	with	increasing	dark	count	rate	or	background	count	rate.	The	visibility	may	be	obtained	directly	from	knowledge	of	the	QBER:		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (12)		The	 visibility	 is	 a	 valid	 estimator	 of	 the	 QBER	 for	 the	 E91	 protocol,	 but	 not	 BB84.	 Using	entangled	photons,	a	Bell-test	provides	a	measure	of	the	quantum	nature	of	the	link.	In	order	to	be	able	to	violate	the	Bell	inequality,	the	overall	visibility	V	should	be	larger	than	1/√2	=	0.71,	since	 the	 observed	 Bell	 parameter	 (=	 V·Smax)	 should	 be	 larger	 than	 2,	 whereas	 its	 quantum	mechanical	 limit	Smax	 =	 2√2.	 Thus,	 the	 SNR	 should	 be	 larger	 than	 2/(√2	 -1)	 =	 4.83.	 As	 seen	above,	this	condition	is	always	satisfied	in	the	case	of	a	successful	QKD	experiment.		The	 visibility	 for	 the	 conditions	 specified	 above	 is	 shown	 in	 figure	 9	 as	 a	 function	 of	 link	attenuation	and	for	three	different	levels	of	dark	count	rate.	As	long	as	the	link	attenuation	does	not	exceed	51	dB,	a	dark	count	rate	up	to	~250	cps	per	detector	can	be	accomodated.		
V = 1−QBER1+QBER
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	A	test	of	the	Bell	inequalities	requires	~1000	coincidences	(corresponding	to	a	3-sigma	violation	with	 S=2.38	 and	 ΔS=0.126)	 [7].	 With	 a	 dark	 count	 rate	 of	 100	 cps	 per	 detector,	 this	 can	 be	reached	within	seconds	or	less	if	the	link	attenuation	is	less	than	40	dB,	and	within	1	minute	if	the	link	attenuation	equals	~50	dB,	as	can	be	seen	by	evaluating	Eq.	(9)	with	the	parameters	of	Table	3.		In	 the	 end,	 the	quantum	secured	 secret	 key	 rate	 is	 obtained	by	using	Eq.	 (11)	 to	 evaluate	 the	QBER	 in	 Eq.	 (10)	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 channel	 losses	 and	 by	 multiplying	 the	 result	 with	 the	coincidence	rate	of	Eq.	(9).	The	result	is	shown	in	Figure	10	(a)	for	the	conservative	scenario	of	Table	3.		
						The	 construction	of	 a	 key	of	 length	105	bits	 could	be	 accomplished	within	one	ground	 station	overpass	(~200	s	measurement	time)	as	long	as	the	link	attenuation	does	not	exceed	40	dB	and	the	dark	count	rate	is	below	250	cps	per	detector.	The	Mission	Specification	of	a	minimum	key	
 
Figure 10. The secure secret key rate for three different values of the dark count rate as a 
function of the link attenuation (solid curve: 100 cps; dotted curve: 250 cps; dashed curve: 1000 
cps per detector). (a) For parameters as in Table 3, (b) for the same set of parameters, except for 
τ = 250 ps (and thus a pair production of 4·108 s-1). 
Figure 9. Visibility as a function of the link attenuation for three different values of the detector dark count 
rate (100, 250, and 1000 cps). 
25/34 length	of	1000	bits	per	experiment	(one	OGS	overpass)	can	be	attained	with	an	average	link	loss	of	 	<45	dB	 if	 the	dark	count	rate	 is	 lower	 than	about	100	cps.	 If	 the	detector	dark	count	rates	would	reach	roughly	1000	cps	per	detector,	the	maximum	link	loss	that	can	be	sustained	is	about	38	 dB.	 As	 we	 will	 show	 further	 down,	 this	 is	 mostly	 due	 to	 the	 assumed	 very	 conservative	coherence	time	window	of	1	ns.		We	may	now	investigate	the	effect	of	two	important	model	parameters:	the	average	number	of	pairs	per	laser	pulse	µ	and	the	coincidence	time	window	τ.	Recall	that	together	they	determine	the	 pair	 production	 rate	Rpair	 =	 µ/τ.	 Increasing	 µ	 while	 τ	 remains	 constant	 therefore	 has	 the	consequence	of	increasing	the	pair	production	rate.	This	will	initially	result	in	a	higher	key	rate,	but	 eventually	 lead	 to	 an	accelerated	production	of	 accidental	 coincidences,	 and	an	effectively	lower	key	 rate.	 If	 instead	µ	 is	 kept	 constant	 and	 the	 coincidence	 time	window	τ	 is	 reduced	 to	achieve	the	same	increase	in	pair	production	rate,	the	secure	key	rate	increases,	and	remains	at	higher	 levels	 at	 high	 link	 attenuation.	 Now	 a	 higher	 pair	 production	 rate	 will	 enable	 the	experiment	to	tolerate	a	significantly	higher	channel	loss.	It	appears	in	fact	realistic	to	expect	a	coincidence	time	window	shorter	than	1	ns.	Detectors	and	electronics	should	enable	reaching	250	ps	easily.	As	mentioned	in	section	1.4.3	we	select	single	photon	detectors	with	a	jitter	<	90	ps.	The	time	tagging	module	itself	generally	contributes	less	than	 100	 ps	 (see	 section	 1.4.4:	 the	 currently	 persued	 solution	 aims	 for	 25	 ps	 maximum	 and	electronic	jitter	below	10	ps),	both	on	the	ground	and	in	the	satellite	segment.	A	state-of-the-art	OGS	polarization	analysis	module	using	semi-conducting	nanowire	single	photon	detectors	could	contribute	a	mere	16	ps	to	the	total	time	jitter	of	[44].	Two	other	effects	are	expected	to	lead	to	only	small	increases	in	τ.	Two	photons	that	departed	the	OGS	at	exactly	the	same	time	may	still	arrive	at	slightly	different	times	at	the	satellite,	as	they	may	have	traversed	slightly	different	path	lengths.	Beam	spreading	over	the	receiver	aperture	could	lead	to	an	increased	coincidence	time	window,	but	this	effect	is	typically	of	the	order	of	1	ps.	Also,	due	to	the	large	velocity	at	which	the	satellite	moves,	 uncertainties	 in	 its	 exact	 position	 (of	 the	 order	 of	 tens	 of	 cm),	 will	 lead	 to	 a	similar	 order	 of	 magnitude	 increase	 in	 the	 effective	 coincidence	 time	 window.	 Together	 this	should	lead	to	a	coincidence	time	window	below	200	ps.	We	therefore	have	also	calculated	the	expected	secure	key	rate	for	the	case	of	τ	=	250	ps	accompanied	by	a	higher	pair	production	rate	of	4·108	s-1.	This	is	about	30%	higher	than	the	value	that	the	Vienna	source	can	currently	attain	without	 damage	 to	 the	 SPDC	 crystal.	 This	 can	 realistically	 be	 achieved,	 e.g.,	 through	 the	implementation	of	a	larger	crystal.	The	result	is	shown	in	Figure	10	(b).		From	 the	 above	 analysis	 we	 conclude	 that	 with	 conservative	 parameters	 for	 the	 source	performance	(108	pairs/s)	and	a	relatively	poor	timing	resolution	(τ	=	1	ns),	the	experiment	can	tolerate	link	losses	up	to	45	dB	by	keeping	dark	and	background	counts	to	well	below	1000	cps.	The	secret	key	rate	would	reach	several	times	10	bits/s.	Under	otherwise	the	same	conditions,	but	 with	 a	 source	 performance	 as	 already	 demonstrated	 in	 practice	 (3·108	 s-1),	 and	 certainly	with	an	improved	source	as	mentioned	above,	and	especially	if	the	coincidence	time	window	can	be	 kept	 small	 (τ	 	 <	 250	 ps),	 the	 experiment	 can	 accomodate	 link	 losses	 up	 to	 50	 dB	 and	 still	produce	a	secret	key	at	a	rate	up	to	several	100	bits/s.	This	 is	shown	in	Figure	11	for	the	two	orbital	scenarios	we	considered	in	section	1.6:	a	direct	overpass	and	a	distant	overpass	in	which	the	 ground	 track	 passes	 the	 OGS	 at	 a	 distance	 of	 500	 km	 under	 atmospheric	 conditions	characterized	by	a	Fried	parameter	r0	=	20	cm	(at	808	nm).	The	figure	also	shows	that	the	length	
26/34 of	 the	 secure	 key	 (i.e.,	 the	 integrated	 key	 rate)	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 time	 during	 one	 OGS	encounter.				
					
1.8. DISCUSSION	Cryptography	 is	 clearly	 central	 to	 the	 telecomm	 industry.	 Attacks	 on	 critical	 infrastructure	components	 that	 need	 to	 be	 controlled	 at	 a	 distance,	 such	 as	 satellites,	 present	 an	 obvious	concern.	Encryption	or	digital	signing	of	messages	using	secure	keys	is	one	way	to	fend	of	such	attacks.	Current	cryptography	standards	such	as	RSA	(invented	in	1977	by	Ron	Rivest,	Adi	Shamir	and	Len	Adleman,	 [66])	rely	on	computational	complexity	and	are	nowadays	the	most	widely	used	computer	 algorithms	 to	 encrypt	 and	 decrypt	 messages.	 With	 the	 actual	 rapid	 increase	 of	computing	power	and	the	increasing	likelihood	of	the	arrival	of	quantum	computers	in	the	not-so-distance	 future,	 the	 security	 offered	 by	 RSA,	 or	 other	 schemes	 using	 different	 trap-door	mechanisms,	will	 likely	 decrease	 rapidly.	 In	 fact	 Peter	 Schor	 demonstrated	 already	 in	 1994	 a	quantum	 algorithm	 able	 to	 crack	 RSA	 in	 polynomial	 time	 [67,	 68].	 The	 eminent	 arrival	 of	quantum	 computers	 clearly	 poses	 a	 serious	 threat	 to	 classical	 cryptography.	 As	 the	 Chinese	Quantum	Experiment	at	Space	Scale	shows,	satellites	can	make	global	QKD	a	reality.	However,	satellite	development	has	so	 far	been	rather	complicated	and	costly.	A	CubeSat	demonstration	such	 as	 proposed	 here	 is	 therefore	 not	 only	 interesting	 in	 its	 own	 right	 and	 opens	 up	 other	potential	new	applications	for	QKD	[68],	but	also	provides	important	risk-mitigation	experience	by	 lowering	 risk	 factors	 for	 future,	 larger	 space	missions,	 potentially	 aiming	 for	 GEO	 satellite	terminals.	 Spin-offs	 include	 atmospheric	 transmission	 and	 turbulence	 characterization,	 and	
Figure 11. Secure key production during one overpass for two scenarios: The lower (red) 
curves are for the case of a source that generates 108 pairs/s and τ = 1 ns, while the lower (red) 
curves are for a pair production of 4·108 s-1 and τ = 250 ps. In both cases the solid curve is for a 
DCR = 250 cps and the dashed curve for DCR = 1000 cps. The bell curves show the secure key 
rate (left axis). For reasons of clarity, they are shown only for DCR = 250 cps. The secure key 
length is given on the right y-axis and for two different values of the dark count rate (250 and 
1000 cps). All other parameters are as in Table 3 and the link attenuations are calculated for 
atmospheric conditions characterized by r0 = 20 cm. The origin of the time axis corresponds to 
the distance of closest approach (550 km, respectively 743 km). (a) for the orbital scenario of a 
direct overpass, and (b) for a overpass at a horizontal distance of 500 km. The key length would 
be zero bit in case DCR = 1000 cps per detector. The curve shown is therefore for DCR = 945 
cps.  
 
27/34 dark-area	 mapping	 near	 urban	 centers,	 both	 crucial	 for	 future	 global	 scale	 quantum	communication	efforts.		Miniaturization	of	CubeSat	subsystems,	such	as	those	needed	for	quantum	communication,	will	provide	a	boost	to	classical	communication	technologies	and	may	lead	to	prototypes	for	future	CubeSat	space-qualified	subsystems	that	one	day	may	be	available	as	COTS	building	blocks	 for	other	CubeSat	missions.		Although	currently	not	a	primary	aim,	launch	of	the	NanoBob	CubeSat	in	a	slightly	elliptic	orbit	will	enable	the	investigation	of	the	gravitational	potential	on	entanglement.	The	finite	speed	of	light	and	the	description	of	gravity	as	space-time	curvature	are	both	manifestations	of	the	role	of	locality	in	the	theory	of	General	Relativity.	Quantum	theory	on	the	other	hand	is	fundamentally	non-local,	 as	 manifested	 by	 quantum	 entanglement.	 These	 two	 theories	 seem	 difficult	 to	reconcile.	 (Still,	 in	a	controversial	paper,	 it	has	 recently	been	proposed	 that	entanglement	and	space-time	 are	 linked	 [70,	 71]).	 Quantum	 entanglement	 can	 be	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 linear	superposition	 of	 two	 states	 that	 is	maintained	 over	 large	 distances.	 General	 Relativity	 on	 the	other	hand	 is	highly	non-linear.	The	consequences	 for	 the	 interaction	of	General	 relativity	and	quantum	 theory	 are	 currently	 a	 hot	 topic	 in	 fundamental	 physics.	 Several	 proposals	 have	appeared	in	the	literature	that	aim	to	reconcile	the	two.	A	number	of	papers	have	suggested	that	the	Schrodinger	equation	should	be	replaced	by	a	non-linear	equation	in	the	presence	of	gravity.	This	would	 imply	that	entanglement	needs	to	break	down.	The	proposal	by	Ralph	and	Pienaar	[72]	is	particularly	attractive	and	has	led	the	Space-QUEST	consortium	to	propose	an	entangled	photon	 experiment	 involving	 the	 ISS	 [4,	 22].	 In	 the	 ISS	 configuration	 the	 theory	 predicts	 a	significantly	 different	 coincidence	 rate	 normalized	 to	 the	 single	 photon	 rate	 compared	 to	standard	quantum	theory.	The	experiment	can	 in	principle	also	be	carried	out	using	NanoBob,	provided	the	satellite	 is	 in	a	slightly	elliptic	orbit	and	a	sufficiently	high	photon	rate	and	short	coherence	 time	of	 the	source	can	be	achieved.	 It	 is	estimated	 that	a	difference	 in	gravitational	field	 gradient	 corresponding	 to	 an	 orbital	 height	 difference	 of	 less	 than	 100	 km	 is	 needed	 in	order	 to	 see	 an	 appreciable	 difference	 in	 the	 decoherence	 factor	 for	 realistic	 cases	 of	 the	coherence	 time	 (0.8	 to	 3	 ps)	 [4].	 The	 effect	 is	 also	 predicted	 to	 increase	 with	 orbital	 height,	making	it	easier	to	observe	from	the	550	km	SSO	proposed	for	NanoBob	than	the	ISS	orbit	at	400	km.	 Alternatively,	 the	 launch	 of	 two	NanoBob	 satellites	 into	 different	 circular	 orbits	may	 still	present	an	economically	attractive	alternative	to	the	use	of	an	elliptical	orbit,	given	that	circular	orbits	 see	 more	 and	 cheaper	 commercial	 launch	 opportunities.	 It	 may	 even	 be	 possible	 to	combine	 data	 obtained	 by	 a	 single	 NanoBob	 satellite	 with	 those	 obtained	 in	 a	 future	 Space-QUEST	 experiment	 on	 board	 of	 the	 ISS.	 A	 limiting	 factor	 is	 likely	 the	 required	 much	 higher	photon	 rate	 in	order	 to	achieve	an	adequate	 signal-to-noise	 ratio.	 Increasing	 the	brightness	of	the	 source	 would	 benefit	 from	 larger	 non-linear	 crystals,	 which	 is	 already	 an	 active	 area	 of	research.	This	 in	 turn	may	 require	 that	 the	photon	 flux	 arriving	at	Alice	be	distributed	over	 a	large	number	of	individual	detectors	–	a	costly	exercise	as	it	is	estimated	that	roughly	a	hundred-fold	higher	photon	flux	is	required.	Without	reducing	the	atmospheric	 losses,	or	 increasing	the	entanglement	 efficiency,	 this	 implies	 installing	 about	 hundred	 conventional	 detector	 units	 or	using	advanced	nanowire	detectors	(about	16	of	them)	for	each	polarization	direction	in	the	OGS	[4].	 The	 space	 segment	 is	 likely	 not	 the	 limiting	 factor	 in	 this	 experiment.	 If	 necessary,	 the	increased	 data	 rate	 could	 be	 handled	 by	 transferring	 the	 data	 to	 the	 ground	 station	 during	multiple	(optical	or	RF)	communication	sessions.			
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1.9. CONCLUSION	Our	 feasibility	 analysis	 shows	 that	QKD	 in	an	uplink	 scenario	between	a	ground	station	and	a	satellite	in	LEO	is	possibly	using	a	space	segment	that	adheres	to	the	12U	CubeSat	standard.	The	SWaP	 analysis	 shows	 that	 the	 requirements	 of	 volume,	weight,	 and	 power	 can	 be	met	with	 a	comfortable	 contingency	margin.	The	design	of	 the	 receiver	 telescope	with	a	FOV	of	215	µrad	guarantees	a	low	background	count	rate	for	a	ground	station	located	on	the	Canary	Islands	(or	a	similar	astronomical	observation	location)	even	under	the	assumption	of	operation	during	a	full	moon	phase.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	FOV	is	 large	enough	that	 the	required	pointing	precision	 is	well	within	reach	of	current	ADCS	technology.	We	have	estimated	the	link	budget	for	an	orbital	scenario	in	which	the	satellite	passes	directly	over	the	OGS,	as	well	as	for	one	in	which	its	ground	track	passes	at	a	distance	of	500	km.	For	this	we	used	conservative	estimates	of	the	uplink	beam	spreading	 due	 to	 diffraction	 and	 atmospheric	 turbulence.	 Subsequently	 taking	 conservative	parameters	 for	the	detection	system,	and	notably	a	 large	coincidence	time	window	of	1	ns,	we	show	 that	 the	 QKD	 experiment	 is	 possible	 for	 both	 orbital	 scenarios	 as	 long	 as	 the	 DCR	 per	detector	 is	 not	much	 larger	 than	 250	 cps.	 The	 secure	 key	 length	 accumulated	 after	 one	 pass	would	 be	 1.2·105	 and	 2.1·104	 bit	 for	 the	 direct	 and	 distant	 overpass,	 respectively,	 for	 a	 Fried	parameter	r0	=	20	cm.	With	a	DCR	of	1000	cps,	the	satellite	would	need	to	pass	almost	directly	over	the	OGS	to	see	a	reasonable	secure	key	generation	rate	(that	still	reaches	7·104	bit	per	pass;	however,	passing	at	a	horizontal	distance	of	500	km	the	secure	key	length	after	one	pass	would	be	zero	bit).	This	an	order	of	magnitude	 lower	 than	 that	 reported	 in	an	early	 feasibility	 study	carried	 out	 by	 Rarity	 and	 colleagues	 [34],	 mostly	 due	 to	 a	 more	 conservative	 and	 realistic	estimate	of	the	atmospheric	link	losses	(an	order	of	magnitude	higher:	nominally	45	dB	versus	35	 dB).	 We	 have	 subsequently	 investigated	 the	 effect	 of	 increasing	 the	 source	 brightness	 or	decreasing	the	coincidence	time	window	within	still	highly	realistic	 limits.	Settling	on	a	source	pair	 generation	 of	 4·108	 s-1	 and	 a	 coincidence	 time	 window	 of	 250	 ps,	 both	 within	 easy	technological	reach,	we	have	shown	that	a	secure	key	rate	of	the	of	between	1.7·105	and	6·105	bits/pass	(for,	respectively,	the	distant	and	the	direct	overpass,	and	assuming	that	up	to	300	s	of	the	orbit	 can	be	 effectively	used	 for	QKD)	 can	be	 reached	as	 long	as	 the	DCR	of	 the	detectors	remain	within	a	factor	of	ten	of	their	initial	DCR	(i.e.,	<	250	cps),	also	after	exposure	to	radiation	in	space.	There	is	now	growing	evidence	that	Si-APDs,	and	in	especially	the	thin	junction,	small	diameter	types	such	as	we	propose	to	use,	will	be	able	to	operate	 in	space	with	such	low	dark	count	 rates	up	 to	one	year	or	 longer.	Recent	 reports	point	 towards	deep	 cooling	 and/or	 laser	annealing	 as	 probably	 successful	 mitigation	 strategies	 [40,	 73].	 With	 the	 shorter	 coincidence	time	window	a	DCR	of	 1000	 cps	 per	 detector	 can	 be	 tolerated,	 yielding	 calculated	 secure	 key	lengths	of	1.0·105	and	5.1·105	bits	for,	respectively,	the	distant	and	direct	overpasses	(with	r0	=	20	cm).		Assuming	an	average	key	length	per	pass	of	2·105	bits	and	100	successful	passes	per	year	over	two	selected	OGSs,	these	stations	could	exchange	an	absolutely	secure	key	of	20	Mbits	per	year,	or	40	Mbits	over	 the	nominal	 lifetime	of	2	years.	This	 is	 an	underestimate,	 as	we	have	 in	 fact	considered	 that	 atmospheric	 conditions	with	 r0	 <	 20	 cm	 do	 not	 contribute	 at	 all	 to	 total	 key	length	and	we	underestimated	to	key	rate	on	days	that	r0	 is	significantly	 larger	than	20	cm.	 In	fact,	a	more	refined	estimate	of	the	maximum	key	length	could	be	calculated	by	summing	over	the	contributions	of	the	different	bins	of	the	Fried	parameter	histogram	of	Fig.	6,	and	to	take	into	account	 the	 exact	 number	of	 passes	 and	 their	 ground	 track	distances	 to	 the	OGS	 for	 a	 chosen	orbital	scenario	(although	it	is	of	course	impossible	to	know	on	forehand	the	exact	atmospheric	
29/34 conditions	during	each	OGS	encounter;	this	is,	however,	an	important	uncertainty	as	the	distant	passes	will	be	more	susceptible	to	poor	atmospheric	conditions,	and	the	more	so	the	higher	the	sum	of	dark	and	background	counts).	In	any	case,	counting	only	the	cost	of	the	launch	(900	k€),	materials	 and	 testing	 costs	 (600	 k€),	 the	 direct	 cost	 are	 predicted	 to	 be	 below	 40	 €/kbit,	whereas	including	labor	the	cost	could	still	be	below	100	€/kbit.		It	may	be	possible	to	reduce	the	size	of	the	satellite	to	6U	or	even	3U	(see	the	companion	paper	in	 this	 issue	 [44]).	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	 both	 volume	 and	 power	 consumption	 risk	 becoming	 the	most	 difficult	 constraints	 to	 satisfy,	 whereas	 both	 the	 3U	 and	 6U	 options	 entail	 an	 obvious	penalty	 of	 ~6	 dB	 in	 the	 link	 budget	 due	 to	 the	 two	 times	 smaller	 receiver	 that	 can	 be	accommodated.	 The	 12U	 solution	 appears	 for	 the	 moment	 the	 preferred	 compromise,	considering	 development	 time,	 overall	 cost,	 performance,	 and	 probability	 of	 success.	 The	payload	could	potentially	also	be	carried	by	a	larger	LEO	satellite,	instead	of	the	12U	CubeSat.	A	 major	 advantage	 of	 the	 proposed	 uplink	 mission	 scenario	 is	 the	 versatility	 of	 the	 space	segment	 payload,	which	will	 be	 compatible	with	 a	 variety	 of	 QKD	 protocols,	 as	well	 as	 other	mission	 scenarios.	 These	 include	 fundamental	 physics	 experiments	 testing	 for	 entanglement	decoherence	in	a	gravitational	potential	and	dark	area	light	pollution	mapping.				
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